Internal Security I Introduction Section 119 of the Constitution states:

Internal Security

http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n3911/pdf/ch04.pdf

I Introduction

Section 119 of the Constitution states:

Protection of States from invasion and violence

The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the

application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic

violence.

Clearly the Constitution contemplates some internal security role for the

Commonwealth. Even if s 119 does not mention Commonwealth military

or naval forces, having the obligation to protect against invasion in the

same sentence as that for domestic violence strongly suggests the use of

such forces for internal security.1

 Having a Commonwealth Government

of limited powers, and a federal division of responsibility which leaves

primary responsibility for internal security to the States, makes finding

authority for ADF internal security action less than straightforward.

English common-law principles do not apply neatly within Australia’s

federal structure. Dixon J made clear in R v Sharkey that:

Section 119 of the Constitution provides that the Commonwealth

shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of

the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.

The reference to invasion explains the words ‘and of the several States’

1 Stephenson shares this view in Peta Stephenson, ‘Fertile Ground for Federalism: Internal

Security, the States and s 119 of the Constitution’ (2015) 43 Federal Law Review 289, 295.

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in s 51 (vi), the defence power. But what is important is the fact that,

except on the application of the Executive Government of the State, it

is not within the province of the Commonwealth to protect the State

against domestic violence. The comments made by Quick & Garran in

the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth bring out clearly the

distinction between matters affecting internal order and matters, which

though in one aspect affecting internal order, concern the functions or

operations of the Federal Government: ‘The maintenance of order in a

State is primarily the concern of the State, for which the police powers

of the State are ordinarily adequate. But even if the State is unable to

cope with domestic violence, the Federal Government has no right to

intervene, for the protection of the State or its citizens, unless called upon

by the State Executive.’2

This federal division of responsibility will be central to much of this

discussion.

This book distinguishes internal security from martial law because it

is possible for the ADF to act for internal security purposes without

assuming civilian government functions, although a situation of martial

law may also require the ADF to conduct internal security operations.

The term ‘internal security’ for this book encompasses any operational

deployment of the ADF to use force for law enforcement purposes for

civil disturbance or major event security. It will also use the term ‘public

order’ where it relates more closely to the references under discussion.

Internal security is a concern which attracts much attention from

commentators because the prospect of troops on the street is a chilling

one.3

 Internal security has also been a practical and theoretical legal issue

2 (1949) 79 CLR 121, 150. Zines appears to support Dixon J’s statement in Leslie Zines,

‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279, 279.

3 Michael Head is the leading critic in Australia of the use of the ADF for internal security, see

‘The Military Call-out Legislation – Some Legal and Constitutional Questions’ (2001) 29(2) Federal

Law Review 273; ‘Calling out the Troops – Disturbing Trends and Unanswered Questions’ (2005) 28

University of New South Wales Law Journal 479; ‘Australia’s Expanded Military Call-out Powers: Causes

for Concern’ (2006) 3(2) University of New England Law Journal 125 (including a criticism of this

author’s views on 146–7) and Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest (Federation

Press, 2009). See also Arne Willy Dahl, ‘Military Assistance to the Police in Situations Requiring the Use

of Armed Force’ (Keynote Address at the New Zealand Armed Forces Law Conference, Trentham Army

Camp, Upper Hutt, New Zealand, 9 February 2007); Simon Bronitt, ‘Balancing Security and Liberty:

Critical Perspectives on Terrorism Law Reform’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Matthew (eds), Fresh

Perspectives on the War on Terror (ANU E Press, 2008) 81. On the history of the British experience, Colm

O’Cinneide, ‘Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom Human

Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Matthew (eds) Fresh Perspectives on 

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4. Internal Security

since before Federation.4

 The fears of a standing army in 17th-century

England seem to have seeped into a modern Australian political culture

which almost supposes a constitutional bar to using the ADF for internal

security, even with the presence of s 119.5

 For example, Mason CJ, Wilson

and Dawson JJ in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan stated that ‘[i]t is not the

ordinary function of the armed services to “execute and maintain the

laws of the Commonwealth”’.6

 Despite requests, the Commonwealth has

not actually relied upon s 119 to protect a State.7

 There is also a line of

thinking in obiter dicta and extracurial judicial writing which sees the

Commonwealth as having an inherent right of self-protection because

the Commonwealth has occasionally used the ADF internally to protect

Commonwealth interests.8

 The Bowral call-out to protect visiting

Commonwealth Heads of Government in 1978 is the most prominent

example of this.9

The Defence Act 1903 (Cth) now provides a statutory footing for most

potential internal security actions by the ADF.10 There are still some

possible actions which fall outside the statutory framework however. What

then are the limits of any residual executive power for internal security?

Can the ADF break the law in order to restore it? The limits for internal

security would appear to be very similar to those for internal martial law

but the difference is that there have been prominent instances of the

ADF conducting internal security operations without statutory authority.

the War on Terror (ANU E Press, 2008) 327, 330–3. For a general discussion of internal security powers

in the United Kingdom and New Zealand see Kiron Reid and Clive Walker, ‘Military Aid in Civil

Emergencies: Lessons from New Zealand’ (1998) 27 Anglo-American Law Review 133.

4 Justice Robert Hope, ‘Protective Security Review’ (Parliamentary Paper 397, Parliament of

Australia, 1979), app 16 ‘The History of Military Involvement in Civilian Security in Britain and

Australia’.

5 See Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 10–11;

A R Blackshield, ‘The Siege of Bowral – the Legal Issues’ [1978] 4(9) March Pacific Defence Reporter

6, 9; Simon Bronitt and Dale Stephens, ‘“Flying Under the Radar” – The Use of Lethal Force Against

Hijacked Aircraft: Recent Australian Developments’ (2007) 7(2) Oxford University Commonwealth

Law Journal 265; Richard Fox and Jodie Lydecker, ‘The Militarisation of Australia’s Federal Criminal

Justice System’ (2008) 32(5) Criminal Law Journal 287, 291–2, although this author does not agree

with the contention made that ‘it is clear’ that the federal executive is not required to wait for a request

from a state executive to intervene to suppress domestic violence under s 119.

6 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 540 (‘Re Tracey’). See Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military

and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 150–3.

7 Elizabeth Ward, ‘Call out the Troops: An Examination of the Legal Basis for Australian Defence

Force Involvement in Non-Defence Matters–Update of a Background Paper issued 5 September

1991’ (1997) Commonwealth Parliament Bills Digest, Appendix A.

8 Discussed below at Part IV.

9 Discussed below at Part IV A.

10 Part IIIAAA.

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Interestingly there are three key incidents and they are all relatively recent.

The first is the 1978 Bowral call-out mentioned above. The other two are

the use of fighter jets to provide security for the Commonwealth Heads of

Government Meeting in 2002 and the visit of the President of the United

States in 2003.11 The prerogative for control and disposition of the forces

would have been sufficient authority for the ADF at least to be present

in each of these instances. The question is whether the ADF could have

then used force just upon the authority of executive power and not relying

upon statute. A further question is whether this executive authority relied

upon incidental executive power, which would be power available to any

citizen, a prerogative power or the nationhood power. The source of such

executive power could have important implications for its limits.

This chapter will first consider the prerogative for the control and

disposition of the forces. It will then address the effect of Part IIIAAA

of  the Defence Act on the availability of executive power for internal

security. It will then turn to the implications of the source of the executive

power, whether ordinary citizens’ powers, prerogative or nationhood

power, for the use of the ADF under such power. It will then analyse the

three uses of the ADF under executive power for internal security. It will

also consider how the Tampa incident fits into this analysis. It will argue

that there is scope for the ADF to conduct internal security operations

under executive power but it does not extend to the use of lethal force.

This executive power authority will also only extend beyond the powers

available to any ordinary person in the clearest cases of necessity.

II Control and Disposition of the Forces

The prerogative for the control and disposition of the forces is important

in relation to internal security because it is the authority for the Crown

to place its forces where it chooses, whether on bases or in public places.

Whilst some Australian case law and comment has focused upon aspects

of this prerogative in respect of the employment relationship between

the Crown and members of the ADF,12 it is more significant in respect

of internal security for giving the executive government the authority to

11 Discussed below at Part IV.

12 Commonwealth v Quince (1944) 68 CLR 227 (‘Quince’); Marks v Commonwealth (1964) 111

CLR 549; Coutts v Commonwealth (1985) 157 CLR 91.

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4. Internal Security

place, organise and equip its forces.13 Whilst there is no Australian case

law directly on point, there is little reason to think that the reasoning of

the cases on control and disposition of the forces discussed in Chapter 2,

such as China Navigation Company Ltd v Attorney-General14 and Chandler

v Director of Public Prosecutions,

15 would not be relevant to an assessment

of the prerogative as to disposition of the ADF. This is important because

‘call-out’, explained further below, is not required to be able to move

forces about. The prerogative for control and disposition of the forces

means that the ADF has freedom of movement anyway.16 Call-out just

places forces at the disposal of the civil authority to use force. As will be

discussed below, it is for the purpose of ‘Aid to Civilian Authorities’ as the

title of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act

2006 (Cth) indicates. Forces are not confined to their bases the rest of the

time. For example, call-out as such is not required to allow the ADF to

give noncoercive assistance in natural disasters or even for strikebreaking,

although the extent to which this is lawful after Pape v Commissioner

of Taxation and Williams v Commonwealth is another question.17

Importantly, it is this prerogative which would also authorise the arms

and equipment that the ADF uses. It could authorise the provision of

riot-control equipment, or live small-arms rounds or armoured vehicles.18

13 See Peter Rowe, Defence: The Legal Implications: Military Law and the Laws of War (Brassey’s,

1987) 3–4.

14 [1932] 2 KB 197.

15 [1964] AC 763.

16 There is no particular legal authority which states that military units require freedom of entry to

be able to enter a city or other local government area. Freedom of entry appears just to be a ceremonial

survival from feudal times as the author has not located any legal authority which relates to it.

17 (2009) 238 CLR 1 (‘Pape’) and (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams’). Notably, of the English

context, Geoffrey Marshall in Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability

(Clarendon Press, 1984) stated that ‘the deployment and use of the armed forces is a prerogative of the

Crown and there seems to be no reason why the Crown should need express authority to order troops

to do what it is lawful for anyone to do (to fight fires, for example)’, 163–8. Such action in Australia

might rely upon a prerogative with respect to emergencies generally, or the nationhood power, as

discussed in Chapter 1. Post Williams however such action might actually require statutory authority.

This point does not particularly relate to the ADF as it does not involve the use of military force, even

if it involves the use of military resources, so it will remain unexplored.

18 Defence Act 1903 (Cth) s 123 states that members of the ADF do not require permission under

a State or Territory law to carry a firearm or do anything else in the course of their duties. This section

does not provide the actual authority for the carriage of the weapon or the conduct of the duty

though, which would be authorised by the prerogative under discussion.

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Taking to the street, air or sea and looking ready to use force could

obviously create a perception of threat or political intimidation so it

must be done with such concerns in mind.19 Part 3 of the Defence Force

Regulations apply ‘if the Defence Force is called out under any lawful

authority other than Part IIIAAA of the Act’.20 Importantly, reg 11C(2)(a)

states that, in utilising the Defence Force in such a call-out, the Chief of

the Defence Force, ‘must not stop or restrict any protest, dissent, assembly

or industrial action, except where there is a reasonable likelihood of the

death of, or serious injury to, persons or serious damage to property’.

The Defence Act 1903 Part IIIAAA Defence Force Aid to the Civil

Authority provisions discussed below prohibit actions of this type under

s 51G as well. In as recent a case as Haskins v Commonwealth21 in 2011,

Heydon J recalled the potential for military forces to threaten internal

security themselves, citing Maitland:22

[l]ow though the reputation of Cromwell is among those who love human

liberty, he made a great negative contribution to that cause after his forces

ensured the victory of the House of Commons over King Charles I.

During the Commonwealth:

‘England came under the domination of the army, parliament itself

becoming the despised slave of the force that it had created. At the

Restoration the very name of a standing army had become hateful to the

classes which were to be the ruling classes.’23

Whilst moving forces from one place to another would be authorised by

the prerogative for control and disposition of the forces, patrolling streets

without a call-out might look like a usurpation of civil authority which

the prerogative would not authorise. The important point here is that

whilst there may be a point at which moving forces about could look like

an unauthorised call-out, of itself, placing forces in various places does not

require a call-out.24 It is important to make this point before discussing

the concept of call-out further.

19 Fox and Lydecker, above n 5, 301–2; Head Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and

Civil Unrest, above n 3, 46.

20 Reg 11A.

21 (2011) 244 CLR 22.

22 F W Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge University Press, 1955) 326.

23 Haskins v Commonwealth (2011) 244 CLR 22, 60.

24 Fox and Lydecker, above n 5, 302, state that having troops on standby is not the same as calling

out the ADF.

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III Part IIIAAA

A History

Use of the ADF for internal security under executive power excited

significant comment after the ‘Siege of Bowral’ in 1978.25 In the Protective

Security Review which followed, Justice Hope recommended that ADF

internal security operations should be on a statutory basis because of the

uncertainty of relying upon common-law powers.26 Interest in the issue

diminished, however, and it was 20 years before this recommendation

had effect when, with the prospect of the Sydney Olympics, Parliament

passed amendments to the Defence Act concerning Defence Force Aid

to the Civil Authority.27 It was not long before events demonstrated the

limitations of the new Part IIIAAA of the Act concerning Defence Force

Aid to the Civil Authority. The often-cited attacks of 11 September 2001

in the United States substantially increased the perception of the threat

of terrorism.28 The use of civil airliners to attack large buildings was

also completely outside of the traditional hijacking, sieges, kidnapping,

assassination, bombing or chemical or biological attack contemplated in

Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act. The 2000 amendments simply did not

contemplate attacks from the air or sea or the need to use force in the air

or maritime environment.29 The inconceivable became manifest, Fortuna

presented itself.

Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act could not authorise the subsequent combat

air patrols over the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional

Meeting in Coolum in 2002 and the visit of the President of the United

25 Term taken from Blackshield, above n 5, 6. For a history of this and earlier strikebreaking

incidents involving the ADF, see Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil

Unrest, above n 3, 37–60.

26 Hope, above n 4, 175, app 18.

27 Bills Digest No 13, 2000–1, Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill

2000. See discussion in Fox and Lydecker, above n 5, 292–3.

28 See Senator Robert Hill, Defence Minister, ‘Defence Minister, Senator Robert Hill, Outlines

the Contribution of the Australian Defence Force towards Security for the Forthcoming CHOGM

meeting’ (Press Release, 22 Feb 2002).

29 The author recalls being asked specifically at the time of the drafting of the legislation whether it

needed an air or maritime aspect and, after consideration, replying ‘no’. For a critique of Part IIIAAA,

see Bronitt and Stephens, above n 5; and also Bronitt, above n 3; Head, ‘The Military Call-out

Legislation – Some Legal and Constitutional Questions’; Head, ‘Calling out the Troops – Disturbing

Trends and Unanswered Questions’; Head, ‘Australia’s Expanded Military Call-out Powers: Causes for

Concern’, Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, 100–22, above n 3.

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States in 2003.30 It also could not provide any additional authority for

warships to use force for the augmented security patrols around Australian

offshore oil and gas platforms which commenced in 2005.31

The approach of the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games and the

creation of Border Protection Command (then Joint Offshore Protection

Command) in 2005 provided impetus to amend the legislation.32 In early

2006, Parliament added substantial new powers to Part IIIAAA to provide

for the use of force in the air and at sea as well as enhanced powers in the

land environment.33 The ADF relied upon these powers, although without

using force, to provide combat air patrols for both the Commonwealth

Games in 2006 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community Leaders’

Forum in Sydney in 2007.34 The latter event did see a Royal Australian

Air Force fighter jet intercept a light aircraft which had strayed into

a restricted zone over Sydney, although without doing more than warn

the light aircraft off.35

B Key Provisions and Limits

Since 2006, Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act has provided, inter alia, for

the use of lethal force by the ADF to destroy certain aircraft in the air

and ships at sea,36 as well as to defend property designated as critical

infrastructure,37 even without a direct threat to life.38 It also provides

cordon and search powers, both at sea39 and ashore,40 around the sites

of incidents, including around moving ships on the high seas.41 It has

30 Department of Defence, Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, Inquiry into

Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Bill (2005) 3.

31 Ibid 4.

32 Ibid 3–4.

33 Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006 (Cth). Notably, the

German Constitutional Court struck down comparable German legislation in 2006 as contrary to

the fundamental right to life, Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) 59

Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 751 (2006), discussed in Oliver Lepsius, ‘Human Dignity and

the Downing of Aircraft: The German Federal Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Prominent Antiterrorism Provision in the New Air-transport Security Act’ (2006) 7(9) German Law Journal 761.

34 Department of Defence, Operation DELUGE (9 May 2007).

35 See Tom Allard, Alexandra Smith, Jordan Baker and David Braithwaite, ‘Cessna Pilot Flew into

Dogfight with RAAF’, Sydney Morning Herald, (online), 10 September 2007.

36 Defence Act, s 51SE.

37 Ibid s 51IB.

38 Ibid s 51CB.

39 Ibid ss 51SF–51SK, 51SL, 51SM.

40 Ibid ss 51K–51R.

41 Ibid s 51SF.

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provision for a certain degree of protection from liability for ADF

members acting under orders.42 The powers are at least as extensive as any

found in the common-law world.

Without addressing the detail of the legislation, the key limitations are,

essentially:

• that domestic (as opposed to external) violence must be occurring

or is likely to occur,

• any authorised action must be to protect Commonwealth interests,

• that, where relevant, any State or self-governing Territory is not, or is

unlikely to be, able to protect the Commonwealth interest, and

• that the ADF should be utilised.43

The last requirement implies that a military level of capability is required

to respond to the threat. The Act requires that the Prime Minister,

Attorney-General and Defence Minister be satisfied of these requirements

before the Governor-General can make an order calling out the ADF.44

There are variations on these requirements. In the offshore area, there is

only a requirement that the authorising ministers be satisfied that there be

a threat to Commonwealth interests and that the ADF should be utilised

to respond to it before the Governor-General can issue a call-out order.45

There is also provision for an anticipatory call-out with respect to air

threats46 or to respond to a request from a State or self-governing Territory

to protect it from domestic violence.47 The Prime Minister alone or the

two other authorising ministers together, or one of them together with

the Deputy Prime Minister, Treasurer or Foreign Affairs Minister, can,

without an order from the Governor-General, make an expedited call-out

order.48 Such an order can last for only five days.49

42 Ibid s 51WB.

43 Ibid s 51A.

44 Ibid s 51A.

45 Ibid s 51AA.

46 Ibid s 51AB.

47 Ibid ss 51B, 51C.

48 Ibid s 51CA.

49 Ibid s 51CA(7)(b).

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C Statutory Interpretation

Section 51Y of the Defence Act is careful to preserve any power the

ADF may otherwise have outside the statutory provisions. It states, in

unusual language for a statute: ‘This Part [Part IIIAAA] does not affect

any utilisation of the Defence Force that would be permitted or required,

or any powers that the Defence Force would have, if this Part were

disregarded’. This section would appear to preserve prerogative powers

with respect to control and disposition of the forces (most importantly

the movement of the forces), war, external operations other than war and

even martial law.50

On the face of it, s 51Y would permit the exercise of internal security

powers under the authority of executive power as well. Part 3 of the

Defence Force Regulations also clearly contemplates this and provides

limited regulation of the responsibilities of the Chief of the Defence Force

and interaction with State and Territory authorities in a call-out other than

under Part IIIAAA. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, necessity should

be a limit upon the use of executive power within the realm. Defence

Force Regulation 11B actually requires that the Chief of the Defence

Force only utilise the ADF ‘in a way that is reasonable and necessary’ in

such situations. As discussed, there are compelling reasons for preferring

statutory power to authorise the use of lethal force over executive power,

not least being the supremacy of the Parliament over the executive. If

Part IIIAAA provides a comprehensive set of internal security powers, it

would be very difficult to argue that it is necessary to rely upon executive

power to do what the legislation provides for, as long as the legislation is

operating as it should. This is not to say that Part IIIAAA extinguishes

executive power on the same topic, it just makes it mostly unnecessary,

and therefore unjustifiable, to resort to executive power.

It comes then to consider when it might be necessary to resort to

executive power to authorise internal security operations by the ADF.

The conceivable situations, except two, are only remotely likely but it

is worth restating that the first iteration of Part IIIAAA in 2000 did not

contemplate the threats which presented on 11 September 2001, only

the year after it came into force. The need to resort to executive power

to respond to contingencies, or Fortuna, is consistent with the theory

of executive power discussed in Chapter 1.

50 See Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 122–6.

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4. Internal Security

As to unforeseen threats, there are few scenarios which the legislation

could not cover. It is very broad in its scope and appears deliberately

drafted to address the widest range of possibilities. The terms ‘domestic

violence’51 and ‘threat’ ‘to Commonwealth interests’52 would cover nearly

all potential reasons for the ADF to use force outside of war. Even so,

should an unforeseen threat to internal security emerge which the

legislation did not address then, where necessity demanded, this chapter

argues that the ADF could rely upon executive power to authorise internal

security operations.

It is slightly more possible to imagine the statutory framework being

inoperable due to the inability of key officials to act, such as the Prime

Minister, other authorising ministers or the Governor-General. In these

situations, executive power may be available. Such a scenario could be one

of martial law because the elected government had ceased to function,

such as occurred in Fiji in 2000.53 The other possibility is where civilian

government continues but the Prime Minister, Attorney-General and

Defence Minister, as well as the Deputy Prime Minister, Treasurer and

Foreign Minister could not act, perhaps due to a bomb blast where they

were all together. In the martial law situation, the ADF would need

to exercise internal security powers on its own authority. In the latter

situation, the Governor-General might assume such powers herself or

himself, or quickly swear in a new government from other ministers.

In either case, the procedural requirements for authorising the use of the

ADF in accordance with Part IIIAAA could not operate (unless the newly

sworn ministers could act in accordance with the legislation). In such

a case, necessity should permit reliance upon executive power to authorise

ADF internal security operations.

As to foreseeable threats, at the other extreme, an internal security situation

might actually be beneath the statutory threshold for the application of

Part IIIAAA. There could be situations where there is no general level

of domestic violence or threat to Commonwealth interests that would

warrant the exercise of Part IIIAAA, but they could require the use of

force nonetheless. Examples might include small-scale protests at ADF

51 Eg Defence Act s 51A.

52 Eg ibid s 51AA.

53 Republic of Fiji Islands v Prasad (Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal, Casey J (Presiding), Barker,

Kapi, Ward and Handley JJA, 1 March 2001) (‘Prasad’).

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bases54 or around ADF personnel that turned violent. The ADF in this

case would need to be acting to prevent an effect on itself. Where this is

the case, the powers of ordinary citizens might provide an authority to act.

This will be discussed below.

There is a further foreseeable scenario which lies outside the scope

of Part  IIIAAA as the legislative scheme does not apply beyond the

Australian offshore area. For the purposes of Part IIIAAA, s 51(1) defines

the Australian offshore area to extend no further than the seas and airspace

over the continental shelf. Section 51(1) provides for areas prescribed by

the regulations but no such regulations exist. The effect of this is that,

should a threat arise in relation to an Australian-flagged vessel beyond

the Australian offshore area, there would be no power available under

Part IIIAAA to deal with it. Any action would have to rely upon executive

power. Such a situation might arguably be an external rather than an

internal security operation. Given that Australian-flagged vessels are

subject to Australian criminal law by virtue of s 6 of the Crimes at Sea

Act 2000 (Cth), and not any other national law when such vessels are in

international waters, the concerns over the use of the ADF for internal

security operations discussed in the introduction to this chapter would

also be applicable. It is worth considering, then, the extent to which the

powers of ordinary citizens or prerogative power might authorise security

actions in relation to Australian-flagged vessels outside the Australian

offshore area.

Quite apart from threats, there is also the possibility of a High Court

challenge to Part IIIAAA powers which resulted in the invalidity of

some or all of that part. Should the ADF have been relying upon powers

which were subsequently found to have been invalid at the time, then

the court may look to see whether executive power could have authorised

the same action. It is not possible to speculate in any more detail but

such a situation would not be unlike that in the Tampa Case55 where the

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) did not apply to a situation where it might have

been expected to. As discussed in Chapter 1, executive power supplied the

authority instead. For this reason, s 51Y of the Defence Act may potentially

be very significant in the case of any invalidity in Part IIIAAA.

54 See the discussion of the protest at the Nurunngar Base in South Australia in 1989. Members of

the 2nd Cavalry Regiment were hastily dispatched to assist South Australian Police protect the base,

although they were not reportedly required to use any force. The operation relied upon ordinary

statutory and common-law powers of arrest and self-defence. Ward, above n 7 (no page numbers).

55 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 (‘Tampa Case’).

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4. Internal Security

IV Three Sources of Authority and

their Limitations

A Ordinary Powers of Members of the ADF

Chapter 3 rejected Dicey’s view that the Crown had no prerogative with

respect to martial law. This was partly because Dicey saw the Crown as

having only the same common-law power and obligation as any other

subject to quell a riot or similar disturbance.56 Dicey’s view on martial law

is hard to maintain in the face of the cases discussed in that chapter. His

views on the shared powers of Crown and subject though with respect

to riots and similar disturbances—that is, internal security as opposed to

martial law—are a different matter. The ordinary Australian citizen today

does have some limited power to respond to a violent situation and this is

a power upon which the Commonwealth, through members of the ADF,

might also rely.

In each jurisdiction, there is common-law or statutory power for any person

to make an arrest for an indictable offence, as well as various common-law

and statutory defences of self-defence or defence of another, preventing

a crime, necessity, and also of sudden and extraordinary emergency.57

Members of the ADF, whether acting in their personal capacity or in the

course of their duty, are also always citizens.58 These powers and defences

are also available to them. In this sense, the Commonwealth could require

members of the ADF, in the course of their duty, to defend themselves

and others or make an arrest by virtue of the same authority that any

citizen could do these things.59 This could be an exercise of the prerogative

with respect to control and disposition of the forces as expressed through

56 A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959)

284–6.

57 Eg Arrest or Preventing Crime: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 349ZC; Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT)

s 41; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3Z; Criminal Code Act (NT) ss 27(e), 33 of Schedule 1; Criminal Code

Act 1899 (Qld) ss 25, 266; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 39; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 25, 243.

Self-Defence, Necessity or Sudden and Extraordinary Emergency: Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162

CLR 645, 660; R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 448; Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT) s 42; Criminal

Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 10.3 & 10.4; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 418–22 (noting that New South

Wales has codified the law of self-defence); Criminal Code Act (NT) s 28(f); Criminal Code Act 1899

(Qld) ss 31(1)(c), 271(1), 272, 273; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), s 46; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)

ss 9AB–9AF; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 31(3), 248, 249, 250; see Bronitt, above n 3, 53.

58 Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 547 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).

59 See Royal Australian Air Force, Operations Law for RAAF Commanders (Australian Air

Publication 1003, 2004) 45.

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178

command power, or as part of its express power under s 61 to execute

and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth. This is consistent with the

statement of French CJ in Williams that:

[T]he executive power of the Commonwealth extends to the doing of all

things which are necessary or reasonably incidental to the execution and

maintenance of a valid law of the Commonwealth once that law has taken

effect. That field of action does not require express statutory authority,

nor is it necessary to find an implied power deriving from the statute. The

necessary power can be found in the words ‘execution and maintenance …

of the laws of the Commonwealth’ appearing in s 61 of the Constitution. The

field of non-statutory executive action also extends to the administration of

departments of State under s 64 of the Constitution and those activities

which may properly be characterised as deriving from the character and

status of the Commonwealth as a national government.60

It is not for this chapter to go into the detail of the powers of arrest and

self-defence and related powers as it is a complex area of the law on its own,

particularly given the subtle differences between the various Australian

jurisdictions, and it has been well traversed elsewhere.61 The main point

is that such powers and defences are available to ordinary citizens, and

therefore to members of the ADF. The question then is the extent to

which the Commonwealth can require members of the ADF to exercise

their own powers as ordinary citizens on behalf of the Commonwealth.

Of course, when well-armed, equipped, uniformed and organised members

of the ADF exercise any of the powers of an ordinary citizen it is not

the same as any ordinary citizen exercising these powers. As discussed in

Chapter 1, Winterton saw a fundamental difference between government

60 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 191; See also limited discussion of ‘ordinary and well recognised

functions of government’, 234 (Gummow and Bell JJ), s 61 grants a power to spend where authorised

by statute or the Constitution, 249, recognised power of Commonwealth to inquire which is held

in common with every other citizen, 206 (Hayne J), Commonwealth may exercise the capacities of

a juristic person ‘in the ordinary course of administering a recognised part of the Commonwealth

government’, 342 (Crennan J), ‘an activity not authorised by the Constitution could not fall within

the power of the Executive’, 373–4 (Kiefel J). Other than the reference to French CJ, these references

are indirect at best in support of this point but they indicate views which are at least not inconsistent

with it. Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonald, ‘Looking at the Executive Power Through the

High Court’s New Spectacles’ (2013) 35(2) Sydney Law Review 253, 261, note this as a source of

executive power as well but do not cite an authority for it.

61 See Rob McLaughlin, ‘The Use of Lethal Force by Military Forces on Law Enforcement

Operations – Is There a “Lawful Authority”?’ (2009) 37(3) Federal Law Review 441, 459, 467; G J

Cartledge, The Soldier’s Dilemma: When to Use Force in Australia (AGPS Press, 1992) 155–8; and

general Australian criminal law texts such as Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles

of Criminal Law (Thomson Lawbook Co, 3rd ed, 2010).

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doing what any citizen could do and a citizen doing the same things.62

Williams would indicate that such actions may not be Commonwealth

actions per se as the Commonwealth does not have the same powers as

that of a natural person. Hayne J in Williams touched on this, without

resolving the matter fully, in referring to Clough v Leahy and the power

of an official to seek information and ask questions:

Griffith CJ recognised that a State, as a polity, acts through individuals

and accepted that an officer of the State executive was not somehow

prevented, when ‘acting for the Crown’, from undertaking action that

‘every man is free to do’, being ‘any act that does not unlawfully interfere

with the liberty or reputation of his neighbour or interfere with the course

of justice’.63

His Honour did not take this to mean that a polity generally, or the

Commonwealth in particular, therefore had the same capacities as

a natural person.64 While only an observation by one judge in the case,

it would suggest however that officials acting in the course of their duty

may rely upon their own powers as a natural person in the course of

that duty. This is consistent with Pirrie v McFarlane,

65 as discussed in

Chapter 2. Further, as discussed in more detail below, the individual ADF

member would be the subject of any prosecution for an excess use of

power, not the Commonwealth. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and

2, the Commonwealth might be the subject of civil action for exceeding

its power with respect to the control and disposition of the forces or to

execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth, or as vicariously

liable for the actions of its officials. As Gageler J stated in M68:

The inclusion of s 75(iii) had the consequence of exposing the

Commonwealth from its inception to common law liability, in contract

and in tort, for its own actions and for actions of officers and agents

of the Executive Government acting within the scope of their de facto

authority.66

62 He saw this as an exercise of prerogative power, George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and

the Governor-General (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 112.

63 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, 257–8 quoting Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139, 155, 167,

157; Appleby and Macdonald, above n 60, 262, 275, note that Williams did not really consider this

area of executive power.

64 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156.

65 (1925) 36 CLR 170, although that case did not concern the use of force.

66 Plaintiff M68 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCA 1 [125] (‘M68’),

citing James v The Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339, 359–60; cf Little v The Commonwealth (1947)

75 CLR 94, 114.

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180

The consequence of this is that the Commonwealth could only require

members of the ADF to effect arrests and defend others where it relates

to another Commonwealth power.67 This is a limitation on the use of

the powers of members of the ADF which they possess by virtue of also

being citizens. For example, it would appear to relate to the execution

and maintenance of a law of the Commonwealth to protect foreign

dignitaries visiting events such as CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of

Government Meeting) and APEC. In particular it is an offence under the

Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 (Cth) to attack such a

person.68 It follows that, even without specific statutory authority such

as Part IIIAAA, a member of the ADF could act to defend such a person

and arrest the assailant, much as any other citizen has the power to do.69

Alternatively, ADF members operating under quite low-level authority,

such as unit or detachment command might, where necessary, use the

powers of an ordinary citizen to protect themselves, their mission, their

equipment or their base or, indeed, members of the local community

where disorder might affect the local ADF presence as part of the

prerogative with respect to control and disposition of the forces.70 It might

be difficult to argue that such action was an exercise of a power of the

Commonwealth if the disturbance really had no effect on the local ADF

presence at all.

The main difference is that the ADF member is likely to be much more

capable of such action than any ordinary citizen. On the other hand, it

would not very likely be an exercise of Commonwealth executive power

to require ADF members to exercise these powers to maintain order in the

streets around their own homes. As discussed, this would be a matter for

the relevant State or Territory police, or the ADF member in their personal

capacity. This is an important limitation arising from the federal structure

of the Constitution, as proposed at the end of Chapter 1. This would be

consistent with the careful distinction in Part IIIAAA between calling out

67 Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156.

68 Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 (Cth) ss 3A, 8.

69 This is consistent with Renfree’s view, Harold Renfree, The Executive Power of the Commonwealth

of Australia (Legal Books, 1984) 457–61.

70 See also Defence Act s 72P relating to the offence of unauthorised entry to Defence premises,

which is very widely defined in s 71A to include virtually any place occupied by the ADF, or Crimes

Act 1914 (Cth) s 30K relating to the offence of obstructing or hindering Commonwealth government

services.

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4. Internal Security

the ADF to protect Commonwealth interests as opposed to responding

to requests from States and self-governing Territories to protect against

domestic violence, reflecting the fundamental limitation of federalism.71

1 Liability of ADF Members

As mentioned above and consistent with the principle of legality such as

found in A v Hayden72 as discussed in Chapter 1, members of the ADF

who exercise powers of arrest or defence of others are personally liable to

criminal prosecution for any excess of force which occurs. This is a key

limitation. As much as such action might be an exercise of Commonwealth

power, without additional specific statutory power such as Part IIIAAA,

members of the ADF carrying out the Commonwealth’s requirement to

maintain the law have no more power than any ordinary citizen in doing

so. Apart from in Queensland,73 Western Australia,74 Tasmania,75 and for

certain war crimes,76 obeying orders is no defence to criminal charges.

It may be that this defence should be more broadly available where such

orders are not manifestly unlawful. As quoted in the introduction to

this book, Starke J neatly stated the position with regard to liability for

following orders in Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd:

If any person commits … a wrongful act or one not justifiable, he

cannot escape liability for the offence, he cannot prevent himself being

sued, merely because he acted in obedience to the order of the Executive

Government or any officer of State.77

Further, without special statutory powers, a member of the ADF stands

in the same position as an ordinary citizen with regard to enforcing the

law. In his much-quoted Charge to the Bristol Grand Jury on a Special

Commission, 1832, Lord Tindal CJ said:

The law acknowledges no distinction in this respect between the soldier

and the private individual. The soldier is still a citizen, lying under the

same authority to preserve the peace of the King as any other subject.78

71 Defence Act ss 51A, 51B, 51C.

72 (1984) 156 CLR 532.

73 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 31.

74 Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s 31.

75 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 38, only in regard to riots.

76 Criminal Code Act 1995 s 268.116(3).

77 Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 353 344, (‘Shaw Savill & Albion

Co Ltd’).

78 5 C & P 254, 261 quoted in H P Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia

(Law Book Company, 1984) 229.

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182

Re Tracey made clear that the position in Australia is the same.79 It would

also not be possible to argue that a matter was nonjusticiable within the

terms of Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service,

discussed in Chapter 2.80

2 Necessity

Another important consequence of the exercise of the powers of an

ordinary citizen by a member of the ADF is that the threshold of necessity

might be easier to satisfy, insofar only as it relates to the liability of ADF

members. Necessity is usually an element of the exercise of the power of

arrest or the right of self-defence. For example, s 266 of the Criminal Code

Act 1899 (Qld) states:

It is lawful for a person to use such force as is reasonably necessary in order

to prevent the commission of an offence which is such that the offender

may be arrested without a warrant.81

As far as the ADF member is concerned, as opposed to the Commonwealth,

the standard of necessity required for any exercise of the power of an

ordinary citizen is only the same as any citizen would have to satisfy in

conducting the same actions. It is a matter for the Commonwealth, rather

than the ADF member, as to whether there is a general level of domestic

violence that has to occur, as with Part IIIAAA, or unforeseen or

extraordinary circumstances as might be required to rely upon prerogative

or nationhood power (discussed below).

3 A Duty to Suppress?

A notable point made by Dicey is that there is a positive duty upon

members of the armed forces to help restore order in situations of riot

and disturbance and the like.82 This is because this is an obligation which

any subject has. Dicey cites R v Pinney83 from 1832 as authority for

this but this was a case about a magistrate, not any ordinary subject.84

The common-law rights and duties in that case were for a justice of the

peace to put down a riot and for the King’s subjects to assist the justice in

79 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 547 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).

80 [1985] AC 374.

81 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 266.

82 Reid and Walker, above n 3, 134–5, note doubts on this point.

83 (1832) 3 B & AD 349.

84 Dicey, above n 56, 284–6. 

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4. Internal Security

doing so. It did not see the obligations of ordinary subjects as anything

like those of a justice.85 Marshall suggests that the emerging convention

in the United Kingdom has been not to permit troops to suppress public

disorder without ministerial approval, in spite of the common-law duty.86

This common-law duty must now be at least questionable. Rowe certainly

rejects such a view with respect to soldiers or citizens.87 To begin with, the

power to quell a riot is effectively a power of government even if, absent

statute, it rests upon a common-law basis. Describing this as the duty of

any citizen or subject seems to have disguised the fact that since the Bristol

riots in 1832, the subject of R v Pinney88 and Lord Tindal LCJ’s Charge

to the Bristol Grand Jury on a Special Commission,

89 there is no record of

a prosecution of a military member for failing in this duty.90 Suppressing

riots and dealing with emergencies has primarily been a  governmental

function. A court faced with this question may well decide that the

development of police forces since then has relieved the ordinary subject

of this duty.

If this is the case, it seems unlikely that a member of the ADF would

have an obligation, independent of his or her chain of command, to act

to assist to put down a riot. If maintaining internal security is actually

a governmental function, it should be done at the direction of government.

In the case of the ADF, this would mean through the chain of command

and not by individual members. In R v Clegg, the 1995 appeal case of

a British soldier found to have used excessive force in self-defence whilst

on patrol in Northern Ireland, Lord Lloyd quoted Lord Diplock’s more

recent perspective on the issue in Attorney-General for Northern Ireland’s

Reference:

91

There is little authority in English law concerning the rights and duties

of a member of the armed forces of the Crown when acting in aid of the

civil power; and what little authority there is relates almost entirely to

the duties of soldiers when troops are called upon to assist in controlling

85 R v Pinney (1832) 3 B & AD 349, 354.

86 Marshall, above n 17, 163–8.

87 Rowe, above n 13, 45–7.

88 Dicey, above n 56, 284–6.

89 5 C & P 254.

90 Rowe, above n 13, 45; Cartledge, above n 61, 158, discusses the court martial of Lieutenant

Colonel Brereton and Captain Warrington for failure in their duty in respect of the riots, stating

‘Brereton committed suicide before the completion of his court martial and Warrington was

cashiered’. Reported in Charles Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration and

Government (John Murray, 1869) 179–80.

91 [1977] AC 105, 136–7. 

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184

a riotous assembly. Where used for such temporary purposes it may

not be inaccurate to describe the legal rights and duties of a soldier as

being no more than those of an ordinary citizen in uniform. But such

a description is in my view misleading in the circumstances in which the

army is currently employed in aid of the civil power in Northern Ireland

… In theory it may be the duty of every citizen when an arrestable offence

is about to be committed in his presence to take whatever reasonable

measures are available to him to prevent the commission of the crime;

but the duty is one of imperfect obligation and does not place him under

any obligation to do anything by which he would expose himself to risk

of personal injury, nor is he under any duty to search for criminals or seek

out crime. In contrast to this a soldier who is employed in aid of the civil

power in Northern Ireland is under a duty, enforceable under military

law, to search for criminals if so ordered by his superior officer and to risk

his own life should this be necessary in preventing terrorist acts. For the

performance of this duty he is armed with a firearm, a self-loading rifle,

from which a bullet, if it hits the human body, is almost certain to cause

serious injury if not death.92

The point here is that the soldier’s duty arose from his superior orders and

not independently from the common law.

Further, if internal security is a government function, then, in accordance

with the division of responsibility of powers in the federation discussed

above, public order rests with the States. It is not for the Commonwealth,

or members of the ADF as a local initiative, to interfere with State

responsibilities. With respect to ‘domestic violence’ in particular, s 119

of the Constitution makes clear that Commonwealth action to protect

a State against domestic violence should occur at the request of the

executive government of the State.93 This obligation would then rest with

the Commonwealth, not members of the ADF having the obligation to

suppress a riot as any other citizen may have. It would appear that ADF

members, as Commonwealth officials in State jurisdictions, could not

have the same positive duty to suppress riots as members of the armed

forces might have in English common law which Dicey asserts. The

situation might be different in the Commonwealth’s Territories, whether

92 [1995] 1 AC 482, 497. As a result of new evidence, Clegg was subsequently retried and acquitted

of murder in 1999. He was found guilty of a lesser charge of unlawful wounding, for which he was

also acquitted on appeal in 2000. These trial cases were not reported in the law reports. Nicholas Watt,

‘Paratrooper Lee Clegg cleared of last charge over death of teenagers’ Guardian (online), 1 February

2000, cited in Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 169.

93 See generally Stephenson, above n 1.

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self-governing or not, but the effect of s 119 in respect of the States would

appear to preclude an obligation upon individual members of the ADF to

maintain internal security.

B Prerogative Power

Chitty’s observation in relation to the King’s war prerogative, quoted

more fully in Chapter 3, that the ‘King may … do various acts growing

out of sudden emergencies’ appears relevant to internal security as well.94

Blackstone, albeit in relation to justice generally, stated that the King

was the ‘general conservator of the peace of the Kingdom’.95 Should Part

IIIAAA be inoperable in an internal security situation, as discussed above,

or the legislation repealed for some reason, prerogative power to maintain

internal security could be relevant. A key point is that the courts will treat

the repression of riots and other internal disturbances as justiciable as they

do not amount to the conduct of war, even if an exercise of prerogative

power.96

Although a case concerned with the war prerogative, in 1964 in Burmah

Oil97 Viscount Radcliffe made useful observations on the flexible nature of

the prerogative, which echo those made by Chitty, including its possible

applications to public safety emergencies such as riots:

[T]he prerogatives of the Crown have been many and various, and it would

not be possible to embrace them under a single description … Others

were as much duties as rights and were vested in the Sovereign as the

leader of the people and the chief executive instrument for protecting the

public safety. No one seems to doubt that a prerogative of this latter kind

was exercisable by the Crown in circumstances of sudden and extreme

94 Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and the Relative Duties and

Rights of the Subject (Butterworths, 1820) 49.

95 Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal

Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (1803, Hein Online

reproduction) 265. Sir Matthew Hale appears not to have distinguished the King’s war prerogative,

including the power to suppress rebellion, from any separate prerogative with respect to internal

security, Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King (Selden Society, written between 1640 and

1664 but unpublished, D E C Yale (ed) (1976 ed) 123, see Tabula Quarta – Tempore Belli and Pax

et Belli Constitutio, xiv, and generally Chapter XII ‘Concerning the Jurisdiction and Office of the

Constable and Marshal, Martial Law, Tempus Belli and Acquisitions by Right of War’.

96 Marais v General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication [1902] AC 109 115 (‘Marais’).

This is perhaps because any proceedings have been criminal proceedings against an official, such as R

v Pinney (1832) 3 B & AD 349 and the Charge to the Bristol Grand Jury on a Special Commission 5 C

& P 254, rather than an application for judicial review.

97 Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 (‘Burmah Oil’).

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186

emergency which put that safety in peril. There is no need to say that the

imminence or outbreak of war was the only circumstance in which that

prerogative could be invoked. Riot, pestilence and conflagration might

well be other circumstances; but without much more recorded history

of unchallenged exercises of such a prerogative.98

With respect to English common law, Rowe sees the use of military force

to put down riots as a prerogative power governed by the common-law

doctrine of necessity.99 Renfree sees that prerogative as being available to

the Commonwealth as well.100 There is no Australian authority on this

point but there is the 1989 English case of R v Secretary of State for the

Home Department, Ex parte Northumbria Police Authority (‘Northumbria

Police Case’), which identifies a prerogative with respect to keeping the

peace or maintaining public order. Nourse LJ said:

The wider prerogative must have extended as much to unlawful acts within

the realm as to the menaces of a foreign power. There is no historical

or other basis for denying to the war prerogative a sister prerogative of

keeping the peace within the realm. I have already expressed the view

that the scarcity of references in the books to the prerogative of keeping

the peace within the realm does not disprove that it exists. Rather it may

point to an unspoken assumption that it does. That assumption is, I think,

made in the judgment of Lord Campbell CJ in Harrison v Bush (1855) 5

E & B 344, 353 … Of special importance for their demonstration of the

Crown’s part in keeping the peace are these words of Lord Blackburn in

Coomber v Berkshire Justices, 9 App Cas Q 61, 67, which may have been

based on Blackstone’s Commentaries (1830), vol 1, p 343:

‘The sheriff also was bound to raise the hue and cry, and call out the

posse comitatus of the county whenever it was necessary for any police

purposes; in so doing he was acting for the Crown, but the burthen fell

on the inhabitants of the county.’

I am of the opinion that a prerogative of keeping the peace within the

realm existed in mediaeval times, probably since the Conquest and,

particular statutory provision apart, that it has not been surrendered by

the Crown in the process of giving its express or implied assent to the

modern system of keeping the peace through the agency of independent

police forces.101

98 Ibid 114–15.

99 Rowe, above n 13, 44–7.

100 Renfree, above n 69, 466–7.

101 [1989] 1 QB 26, 58–9.

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4. Internal Security

This case only concerned the provision of riot equipment to the police

by the Home Secretary without statutory authority. It did identify that

the armed forces could exercise the prerogative,102 but in doing so did not

describe any specific actions beyond that which any ordinary citizen could

take. It might extend to putting troops on the street with the apparent

intention of using force but there is virtually no authority that justifies the

use of lethal force beyond the requirements of self-defence.

McLaughlin notes that Attorney-General for Northern Ireland’s Reference103

and some earlier cases may appear to grant some limited authority to

shoot fleeing suspects without an immediate associated threat to life.104

These cases are not consistent with more recent authorities though,

and may be explicable by the political context of the Northern Ireland

troubles. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland’s Reference105 is not even

really consistent within itself.106 McLaughlin is emphatic that there is no

broader power for military forces in Australia or the United Kingdom

to use lethal force in internal security operations beyond that required

for self-defence.107 Particularly as Attorney-General for Northern Ireland’s

Reference108 referred to statutory powers, there is no authority for the

prerogative power with respect to public order alone to authorise the use

of lethal force. There is not even authority for any direct interference with

the liberties of members of the public beyond that which any ordinary

citizen could lawfully exercise.

1 Necessity

Consistent with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1, necessity may

possibly authorise nonlethal actions under prerogative power which no

ordinary citizen could perform. In a situation like the Bowral example

discussed below, this may possibly include the cordon and search of areas,

maintaining vehicle checkpoints and so on.109 This is different to the use

102 Ibid 51. Zines criticised this case as too wide and having too little basis in authority, hoping that it

would not be followed in Australia. In Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’,

above n 2, 287.

103 [1977] AC 105.

104 McLaughlin, above n 61, 459, 467.

105 [1977] AC 105.

106 McLaughlin, above n 61, 459, 467.

107 Ibid 467–9. Head also discusses this issue, Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military

and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 165–77.

108 [1977] AC 105.

109 Cartledge, above n 61, 131, 136.

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of the powers of an ordinary citizen because it goes beyond actions which

any ordinary citizen could perform. Necessity in the case of prerogative

power to restore internal security would have to be a state necessity in the

sense discussed in the previous chapter on martial law.110 In the absence

of any authority this is a most uncertain area of the law.111 The necessity

would have to be very clear if members of the ADF were to be able to

avoid personal criminal or civil liability for what would otherwise be

unlawful acts. Lord Pearce usefully distinguished the stricter requirements

of necessity in case of riot as opposed to war in Burmah Oil:

It may well be that, so far as riot and rebellion within the realm are

concerned, ‘the power of the Crown, like the power of any other

magistrate and, indeed, of every citizen, is derived from and measured

by the necessity of the case.’ See Professor Holdsworth’s History of English

Law, vol. 10, pp 708–9 … But the right of the Crown to take extreme

measures or declare martial law against its own subjects differs from its

rights when there is a state of war against enemy subjects and is more

jealously regarded by the law. And no authority has been cited to show

that the Crown prerogative in war has been regarded as having the same

limitations as its rights in dealing with riot and rebellion.112

This is perhaps why there have been indemnity acts113 in the past where

internal security actions have been legally questionable and, therefore,

perhaps why there is a dearth of authority on the subject.

2 Federal Division of Responsibility

While necessity still must justify and limit the use of prerogative power

in the Australian context perhaps, more significantly, the scope of the

ADF to take internal security action is also limited by the scope of

Commonwealth executive power. As mentioned above, general public

order is a matter for the States, not the Commonwealth.114 The 2002

Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism

Arrangements recognised this as it provided for the States to refer quite

110 See Mark Stavsky, ‘The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan’ (1983) 16(2) Cornell International

Law Journal 341, 350–2.

111 As to the uncertainty of necessity as a common-law defence see R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443.

112 Burmah Oil [1965] AC 75, 144.

113 Martial Law Indemnity Act 1854 (Vic).

114 R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 150. See also Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian

Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 67; Blackshield, above n 5, 6. See generally H V Evatt, The Royal

Prerogative (Law Book Co, first presented as a doctoral thesis 1924, with commentary by Leslie Zines,

1987) 226–38.

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4. Internal Security

specific powers to criminalise terrorist acts to the Commonwealth115 while

retaining primary jurisdiction for operational responses to terrorism.

116

As a result, the Commonwealth’s responsibility for internal security is less

for general public order matters, such as riots, than it is for the security

of such matters as foreign dignitaries, including around major events, the

conduct of federal elections, the postal service, the execution of court

processes, and the air and maritime domains.117

These are not matters which the authorities for the prerogative with

respect to public order really touch upon. They will be discussed within

the context of nationhood power below. Renfree saw them as aspects of the

‘King’s peace in relation to the Commonwealth’, and therefore probably

matters of prerogative power.118 As stated in Chapter 1, Twomey119

argues that there is a prerogative power of self-protection relying upon

Burmah Oil120 and so there is no need for a nationhood power source of

authority. She does not cite a pinpoint reference in the case however and

it is difficult to see how it could be authority for a federal government to

intervene in a State to protect its own functions. If there can have been

no new prerogatives since 1689, when there was no contemplation of

a federal Commonwealth of Australia, it is difficult to see how prerogative

power could authorise Commonwealth intervention in a State to protect

Commonwealth functions. For this reason it is arguably preferable to refer

to the text of s 61 itself, a nationhood power approach, for the source of

authority. Where the Commonwealth could be concerned with general

public order, it would be in the Territories121 and in situations so serious

as to be beyond the capacity of the States to cope and leading to a request

for Commonwealth assistance.122

115 This occurred under s 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, see, eg, Terrorism (Commonwealth

Powers) Act 2003 (NSW), sch 1 of which actually provided the relevant draft amendments to the

Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995.

116 Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements 2002

(24  October 2002) paragraph 2.4 <www.dpc.wa.gov.au/ossec/CounterTerrorismArrangements/

ProtectingCriticalInfrastructure/Documents/2002IGAonCounter-TerrorismArrangments.pdf>.

See Stephenson, above n 1, 309–12.

117 Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements, para 2.4 (e).

See also Head, Calling out the Troops: The Australian Military and Civil Unrest, above n 3, 77–97.

118 Renfree, above n 69, 460–1.

119 Anne Twomey, ‘Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power – Pape, the Prerogative and

Nationhood Powers’ (2010) 34(1) Melbourne University Law Review 314, 332–4.

120 [1965] AC 75.

121 On call-out on the Gazelle Peninsula, Papua New Guinea (then an Australian territory), where

troops did not actually deploy, see Ward, above n 7 (no page numbers).

122 See Michael Eburn, ‘Responding to Catastrophic Natural Disasters and the Need for

Commonwealth Legislation’ (2011) 10(3) Canberra Law Review 81, 87–91.

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If the division of responsibilities between the States and the Commonwealth

leaves general public order to the States, can the Commonwealth exercise

prerogative power to maintain public order on behalf of the States?

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, s 119 of the Constitution

provides that the Commonwealth shall protect the States from domestic

violence. The condition is that this be on the application of the executive

government of the State. This appears to be a quid pro quo for the States

transferring their military capability to the Commonwealth under ss 69

and 114 of the Constitution.

123 Given that at the time of drafting the

Constitution, nationhood power was not a concept known to constitutional

law,124 it is likely that the effect of these provisions was meant to be that

the Commonwealth would exercise prerogative power to maintain public

order in the States. Section 119 recognises that the States had jurisdiction

over public order, and therefore had the relevant prerogative power,

but that the Commonwealth had the military capability to enforce it.

It would appear, then, that when the Commonwealth intervenes in a State

to protect against domestic violence, at the application of the executive

government of the State, it can rely upon the authority of prerogative to do

so.125 This would be no different in a Territory, except that there would be

no constitutional requirement for the Commonwealth to receive a request

from the executive government of the Territory concerned.126

C Nationhood Power

Chapter 1 discussed that there may be a basis to use the ADF under

nationhood power where there is no prerogative available. This is likely

only to be in circumstances where the English character of the prerogative

cannot operate within Australia’s distinct constitutional arrangements. This

makes the actual experience in Australia of the use of the ADF for internal

security, which this chapter will discuss below, at least as significant as

the predominantly English common-law authorities on restoring public

order. As the prerogative to restore order resides primarily with the States,

the Commonwealth therefore might only act unilaterally when it is doing

so to protect its own functions. Such unilateral action would most likely

be an exercise of nationhood power because, as discussed above, there

123 See Evatt, above n 114, 232–3.

124 See Twomey, above n 119, 327–43.

125 See Renfree, above n 69, 467–9. This is consistent with Stephenson’s view that s 119 is not the

source of the power but merely regulates it, above n 1, 292.

126 See Renfree, above n 69, 484–6.

191

4. Internal Security

are no authorities which would support prerogative power as the basis

to protect Commonwealth government functions.127 It is a distinct issue

in the debate which followed the Bowral call-out as to whether it was

actually some of form of nationhood power which provided the source of

executive power in that situation.128

As discussed in Chapter 1, in an extreme case, nationhood power justified

by necessity may even extend to restoring State government functions

without a request from the State concerned, where the State was no longer

capable of making the request. If a State government effectively collapsed,

it would most likely be ‘peculiarly within the capacity and resources of

the Commonwealth Government’ to restore its functioning.129 This view

relies upon the text of s 61 as well as the theory that executive power must

be able to respond to contingency, Fortuna. As prerogative power in the

Australian setting could not extend that far, the only power that could be

available is nationhood power. Experience in Australia has not tested the

limits to this point but it has provided some significant exercises of using

the ADF which illustrate the potential scope of nationhood power.

V The Three ADF Internal Security

Operations under Executive Power

A Bowral 1978

Justice Hope in his Protective Security Review of 1979 provided a detailed

description of the events which became known as the ‘Bowral call-out’, the

essence of which is as follows.130 On 13 February 1978, a bomb exploded

outside the Hilton Hotel in Sydney, killing two people, fatally wounding

another and injuring a further eight people.131 A number of visiting heads

of government were staying at the Hilton Hotel for the Commonwealth

Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHOGRM).132 The meeting

127 See also discussion in Joe McNamara, ‘The Commonwealth Response to Cyclone Tracy:

Implications for Future Disasters’ (2012) 27(2) The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 37.

128 See Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 78, 207 and Blackshield,

above n 5, 7, discussed further below.

129 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63.

130 Hope, above n 4.

131 Ibid 258; Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 78, 195.

132 Hope, above n 4, 257.

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was due to visit Bowral the next day for two days.133 Prime Minister Fraser

and Premier Wran of New South Wales met to discuss the appropriate

response.134 The New South Wales Police Commander stated that he

did not have adequate resources to guarantee the security of the visitors

between Sydney and Bowral. A meeting of the Federal Cabinet the same

day decided to call out the ADF to provide security between Sydney and

Bowral.135 With the concurrence of Premier Wran, there was no formal

request from the Government of New South Wales for protection. The callout would essentially be to protect the interests of the Commonwealth,

that is the security of the visiting heads of government.136 At a meeting of

the Executive Council later the same day, the Governor-General signed an

order-in-council calling out the ADF.137 It stated, in part:

Whereas I am satisfied, by reason of terrorist activities and related violence

that have occurred in the State of New South Wales, that it is necessary

a. for the purpose of safeguarding the national and international interests

of the Commonwealth of Australia;

b. for giving effect to the obligations of the Commonwealth of Australia

in relation to the protection of internationally protected persons.138

There was no specific statutory basis for this call-out, other than the

indirect reference to the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976

(Cth), and the ADF relied upon no specific statutory powers. Also on

13 February 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs signed a Requisition

of the Civil Authority requiring Brigadier Butler, the officer commanding

the forces involved, to order his forces out. The Minister for Foreign

Affairs signed a requisition ordering those forces in on 16 February 1978.

The Governor-General revoked the call-out order at an Executive Council

meeting on 20 February, when the last of the visitors had left Australia.139

Approximately 1,900 armed Army and Royal Australian Air Force

(RAAF) personnel secured the route between Sydney and Bowral with

equipment including helicopters, armoured personnel carriers and mine

133 Ibid 258.

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid 257–62.

136 Ibid 258–9.

137 Ibid 257–62.

138 Ibid 321.

139 Ibid 258–9, 262, see also ‘Appendix 15: Documents Relating to the Call Out of the Defence

Force During the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting, Sydney, February 1978’,

320–3.

193

4. Internal Security

detectors. The arrangements were to have the New South Wales police

interact directly with the civil community and for the ADF to maintain a

low profile, conducting searches for explosives and surveillance of the area

generally.140 Even so, the ADF had Rules of Engagement authorising the

use of lethal force as a last resort, with the emphasis on minimum force.141

In essence a very large ADF presence secured the CHOGRM travel route

for three days, with authority to use lethal force. The legal basis for this

action was executive power. The only explicit powers available to the ADF

would have been those available to an ordinary citizen relating to arrest,

self-defence and necessity. There was a good deal of consideration after

the event of the legal basis of the Bowral call-out. The opinions of Justice

Hope in his Protective Security Review and former High Court Justice Sir

Victor Windeyer in his extracurial legal opinion annexed to that Review142

are worth examination.

1 Protecting Commonwealth Interests and

Nationhood Power

The opinions of Justice Hope and Sir Victor Windeyer in the Protective

Security Review are the most thorough consideration of the legal basis of

the 1978 operation. Sir Victor did not cite authority for the proposition

that the Commonwealth has the inherent power ‘to employ members of

its Defence Force “for the protection of its servants or property or the

safeguarding of its interests”’,143 other than the constitutional commentary

of Quick and Garran referring to the United States case Re Debs of 1895.144

Sir Victor saw such power as an incident of nationhood:

The power of the Commonwealth Government to use the armed Forces

at its command to prevent or suppress disorder that might subvert its

lawful authority arises fundamentally, I think, because the Constitution

140 Ibid 260–1. See also Malcom Fraser and Margaret Simons, Malcolm Fraser: The Political

Memoirs: Commemorative Edition (Melbourne University Press, 2015) 135, citing this author’s views

on the Bowral call-out as published in Cameron Moore, ‘“To Execute and Maintain the Laws of the

Commonwealth” The ADF and Internal Security – Some Old Issues with New Relevance’ (2005)

28(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 523.

141 Hope, above n 4, 263.

142 Hope, above n 4, ‘Appendix 9: Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, KBE, CB, DSO on Certain

Questions Concerning the Position of Members of the Defence Force When Called Out to Aid the

Civil Power’, 277.

143 Hope, above n 4, 279, quoting from the Australian Military Regulations, although explicitly

stating that these regulations do not create the power, but assume it. See also Ward, above n 7, for

a view of Sir Victor’s opinion.

144 158 US 564 (1895).

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created a sovereign body politic with the attributes that are inherent in

such a body. The Commonwealth of Australia is not only a federation

of States. It is a nation.145

Referring to section 61, Sir Victor said that:

[T]he ultimate authority for the calling out of the Defence Force …

was thus the power and the duty of the Commonwealth to protect the

national interest and to uphold the laws of the Commonwealth. Being by

order of the Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Executive

Council, it was of unquestionable validity.146

Justice Hope agreed with Sir Victor and elaborated further on this point.

He relied upon the obiter dicta of Dixon J in the Communist Party Case,

quoting the following passage (excluding that in square brackets):

[In point of constitutional theory the power to legislate for the protection

of an existing form of government ought not to be based on a conception,

if otherwise adequate, adequate only to assist those holding power to resist

or suppress obstruction or opposition or attempts to displace them or

the form of government they defend. As appears from Burns v Ransley

(1949) 79 CLR, at p 116 and R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR, at pp 148, 149,

I take the view that the power to legislate against subversive conduct has]

a source in principle that is deeper or wider than a series of combinations

of the words of s 51 (xxxix) with those of other constitutional powers.

I prefer the view adopted in the United States, which is stated in Black’s

American Constitutional Law (1910), 2nd ed, s 153, p 210, as follows: ‘…

it is within the necessary power of the federal government to protect its

own existence and the unhindered play of its legitimate activities. And to

this end, it may provide for the punishment of treason the suppression

of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting down of all individual

or concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with the discharge of the

proper business of government’.147

Justice Hope also referred to the obiter dicta of Dixon J in R v Sharkey,

including this statement quoted from Quick and Garran, the first part

of which appeared in the introduction to this chapter:

145 Hope, above n 4, ‘Appendix 9: Opinion of Sir Victor Windeyer, KBE, CB, DSO on Certain

Questions Concerning the Position of Members of the Defence Force When Called Out to Aid the

Civil Power’, 279.

146 Ibid 280. It is important to note that Sir Victor was not asked to give an opinion on the

constitutional validity of the call-out, but rather on the powers and obligations of a member of the

Defence Force when called out, and whether there should be changes to the law relating to them.

147 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 (‘Australian Communist Party’);

Hope, above n 4, 28.

195

4. Internal Security

If, however, domestic violence within a State is of such a character as to

interfere with the operations of the Federal Government, or with rights

and privileges of federal citizenship, the Federal Government may clearly,

without a summons from the State, interfere to restore order. Thus if

a riot in a State interfered with the carriage of the federal mails, or with

interstate commerce, or with the right of an elector to record his vote

at federal elections, the Federal Government could use all force at its

disposal, not to protect the State, but to protect itself. Were it otherwise,

the Federal Government would be dependent on the Governments of the

States for the effective exercise of its powers.148

Justice Hope suggested that a relevant Commonwealth statute

would indicate a Commonwealth interest, but that there could be

Commonwealth interests worthy of protection by the ADF even without

a relevant statute. He gave the example of protecting a visiting United

States nuclear submarine.149

It is important to note however that Dixon J, in the Communist Party

Case150 and R v Sharkey151 discusses only the legislative power of the

Commonwealth operating with the executive power to intervene to

protect its interests. He did not discuss executive power as the sole source

of authority in this context. To rely on this authority, one has to presume

that the executive power can authorise action on the basis of the words

in s 61, which state ‘extends to the execution and maintenance of this

Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth’.152

A number of those who wrote on the Bowral call-out at the time have not

disputed that executive power authorised the operation. Lee wrote that

‘[i]t is also possible to justify such intervention by invoking a doctrine

of inherent power, in this instance, inherent executive power of selfprotection.’153 Blackshield stated:

148 (1949) 79 CLR 121, 150.

149 Hope, above n 4, 152, although ordinary citizens’ powers to defend others or defend property

might be sufficient to do this.

150 (1951) 83 CLR 1.

151 (1949) 79 CLR 121.

152 Justice Hope stated that ‘Generally speaking, where the Commonwealth has power to legislate,

it also has executive power’ above n 4, 32. Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156, clearly makes this view of

the law no longer tenable on such a bare formulation.

153 Lee, The Emergency Powers of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 78, 207.

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The object of calling out the troops was not to protect the people of New

South Wales against ‘domestic violence’, but to protect eleven visiting heads

of state against possible threats to their safety … The Commonwealth, in

calling out the troops, was thus protecting an inherent interest of its own

… just as the 1971 [Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act]

legislation was clearly valid as an exercise of Commonwealth legislative

power over external affairs (Constitution s 51 vi) [sic: should be s 51(xxix)],

so the CHOGRM call-out was valid as an exercise of the corresponding

executive power … the Commonwealth’s executive power … includes an

amorphous and unexplored bundle of attributes of sovereignty, inherent

in the fact of nationhood and of international personality.154

As discussed in Chapter 1, there has been some significant case law

on nationhood power since 1978. Even so, the views expressed above

are consistent with a view of nationhood as the source of power, even

if more recent jurisprudence has refined the source and characteristics

of that power.155 However, while a number of authorities support the

‘incident of nationhood’ as a source of power, the High Court’s more

recent cases concern such things as financial crises156 or the Bicentennial

celebration.157 These cases do not specifically address the use of force by the

ADF for internal security.158 The High Court judgment that most directly

addressed the use of force under nationhood power was that of Isaacs J in

R v Kidman.159 His Honour described the existence of necessary executive

powers for the Commonwealth’s inherent right of self-protection, stating

that ‘a man obstructing any Commonwealth officer in the performance

of his duty may be thrust aside with all the force necessary to enable

the officer to perform his duty’.160 The only source of executive authority

for the Bowral call-out could have been nationhood power as there is

no readily identifiable prerogative power to protect visiting dignitaries,

and, as Premier Wran and Prime Minister Fraser decided, the security

of CHOGRM was a Commonwealth responsibility.

154 Blackshield, above n 5, 7; Cartledge, above n 61, 131.

155 Particularly Williams (2012) 248 CLR 156 and Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1.

156 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1.

157 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79.

158 See discussion on coercive aspects of the executive power in Graeme Hill, ‘Will the High Court

‘Wakim’ Chapter II of the Constitution?’ (2003) 31(3) Federal Law Review 445, 458–9.

159 (1915) 20 CLR 425.

160 Ibid 440–1. In the Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1, 188, 259, Fullagar J quoted Isaacs

J with approval on this point, but in respect of a Commonwealth power to legislate for its own

protection.

197

4. Internal Security

B CHOGM 2002 and POTUS 2003

The Government clearly stated in each case of the use of the ADF—to

protect the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)

in 2002 and to protect the President of the United States in 2003—that

such actions were to fulfil Australia’s obligations to protect visiting heads

of state and government.161 There was no public review of these actions

akin to the Hope Protective Security Review, and there are few relevant

documents in the public domain. Based on the public statements however,

the 2002 and 2003 operations relied upon the same legal basis as that for

the Bowral call-out, even if the procedural aspects may have differed.

As discussed, the potential threat from the air to the 2002 CHOGM

at Coolum took the use of the ADF for internal security outside the

provisions of Part IIIAAA. The Defence Minister announced that the

RAAF would use force against civilian aircraft perceived to be a threat to

CHOGM.162 Conceivably, this could have involved the shooting down of

civilian aircraft by fighter jets in order to prevent a suicidal crash into the

meeting place. There was no clear statement as to the legal basis of this

operation at the time although it was made clear subsequently in the 2005

Department of Defence Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional

Committee Inquiry into Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian

Authorities) Bill.

163 In 2003 the ADF conducted a similar operation over

Canberra to protect the visiting President of the United States. As stated

by the official Defence Spokesperson, Brigadier Hannan:

[O]n this occasion we’ll also be providing a number of F/A-18 fighter

aircraft that will provide protection in the very unlikely event of a threat

emerging from the air. This isn’t the first time we’ve done this, the public

will be familiar with the arrangements that were put in place for CHOGM

last year and these arrangements will be similar.

164

161 See Robert Hill, above n 28; Department of Defence, Submission to Senate Legal and

Constitutional Committee, above n 30.

162 Senator Robert Hill, above n 28.

163 Department of Defence, Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, above n 30, 10.

164 Brigadier Mike Hannan, ‘Defence Support to US President’s Visit’ (Transcript of Official

Interview by Defence Spokesperson, 21 October 2003) <www.defence.gov.au/media/2003/ACF9A5.

doc> (site discontinued).

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C Implications for Executive Power

None of the three operations in question actually saw the use of force but

each of them contemplated it. Even without the use of any force, in the

case of the Bowral call-out, the call-out procedure itself ensured that the

actions of the ADF in patrolling around Bowral were clearly subordinate

to the control of the civilian government. Had the need to use force

escalated, it would not have been within the power of ordinary citizens to

cordon off public areas and control the movement of people and vehicles

in order to protect visiting dignitaries. If this had occurred, and the

operation had gone beyond the authority which the powers of ordinary

citizens could have provided, it could only have been under the authority

of nationhood power as there was no prerogative or statute authorising

more forceful action. Given that the bomb blast at the beginning of the

meeting was unexpected and the Commonwealth had a responsibility

to protect the dignitaries, executive power, whatever its characterisation,

arguably was available to authorise necessary action to protect life. It was

the only source of power available within the time period. Parliament

did not have time to grant relevant statutory power. Necessity is a key

limitation and, again, an imprecise one but in this case the action was

quite limited in both geographical scope and intensity. If the Bowral callout had required more than the powers of ordinary citizens, it might have

been consistent with a characterisation of executive power as a means to

respond to Fortuna.

The difficulty is that, as discussed, there is very little authority to do

such things under prerogative power, let alone nationhood power. The

authorities for nationhood power do not extend explicitly to the conduct

of internal security operations by the ADF. The closest authority involving

ADF action is the Tampa Case which is subject to much criticism, as

discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, and can be confined to border protection

actions.165 A reliance on nationhood power for ADF internal security

operations is only arguable at best. It should be relied upon, as French

CJ put it in Pape,

166 ‘conservatively’ because to rely upon such precarious

authority for extreme measures such as putting troops on the street could

challenge the principle of legality and enter the realm of extraconstitutional

power. As much as nationhood power exists, without more substance it

could become a pretext rather than a lawful authority in such a situation.

165 (2001) 110 FCR 491. See below n 176 for examples of criticism.

166 (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24. 

199

4. Internal Security

As Winterton feared, ‘once the realm of extra-constitutional power has

been entered, there is no logical limit to its ambit’.167 Such action could

also expose ADF personnel to personal liability for carrying out unlawful

orders, which they would likely obey because of Australia’s long heritage

of military subordination to the civilian government.168

As with prerogative power, nationhood power alone could not be an

authority to use lethal force or force likely to cause serious injury, nor to

deprive a person of their liberty. Nationhood power could only authorise

such action when ordinary criminal law would permit it.169 Nationhood

power alone might be argued, without the support of the powers

available to ordinary citizens, where it justifies the minimum necessary

encroachment upon the law. It might authorise interference with freedom

of movement such as in the examples mentioned above of blocking roads,

maintaining vehicle check points and possibly even trespassing upon

property or person by searching vehicles, buildings and people where the

threat to life warranted it. It might be little different to prerogative power

in that regard but possibly even more fraught with uncertainty.

The combat air patrols in 2002 and 2003, on the other hand, had

a different character. They were planned well in advance for a foreseeable

threat.170 The prerogative as to the disposition of the forces would have

been sufficient to authorise fighter aircraft to patrol the skies. While clearly

it is not for any ordinary person to use a fighter jet to defend another, it

would be difficult to argue that necessity could justify anything further

than what the ordinary criminal law of defence of others would authorise.

In the air there are no intermediate levels of force available between

warning and lethal levels of force, such as cordoning off areas or setting up

road blocks, because it is physically impossible. After escalating through

levels of warning to an aircraft, possibly including warning shots fired

close to it, the only use of force option possible is firing at or into the

aircraft with most likely lethal consequences. Any firing at or into an

aircraft is highly likely to cause death. If nationhood power alone should

167 George Winterton, ‘Extra-Constitutional Notions in Australian Constitutional Law’ (1986)

16 Federal Law Review 223, 238, quoted in H P Lee, ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto: Constitutional

Fidelity in Troubled Times’ in H P Lee and Peter Gerangelos (eds), Constitutional Advancement in

a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton (Federation Press, 2009), 54.

168 Re Tracey (1989) 166 CLR 518, 538, 546 (Mason, CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ); also CPCF v

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1 (French CJ) (‘CPCF’).

169 See Blackshield, above n 5, 10.

170 Hannan, above n 164.

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not extend to the use of lethal force, then it seems that only when it

operates together with the law of the defence of others could it authorise

the use of any force in the air. If the requirements of the defence of others

are not met then it is difficult to see how any other use of force against

an aircraft could be lawful.171 Bronitt and Stephens would appear to share

this view.172 For this reason no additional executive power, beyond simply

having aircraft in the air, should have been available because it could not

authorise any action in the air other than the use of lethal force. In respect

of the combat air patrols in 2002 and 2003 then, ADF members could

only have used the powers they have as ordinary citizens, such as the law

of defence of others.

Nationhood power was also important insofar as it might justify

Commonwealth intervention outside of s 119 but even then, State police

forces have virtually no capacity to respond to a threat from the air. Air

patrols over a State hardly seem to be an intrusion in that State contrary

to s 119, so a resort to a nationhood power argument to justify this seems

unlikely to be necessary.

VI Tampa?

Where does the use of the ADF to board the MV Tampa in 2001 under

the authority of executive power fit into all of this? Although this book has

discussed the profound implications of the Tampa Case173 for nationhood

power, executive power more generally and the incident as a whole for the

relationship between the ADF and the elected civilian government, it has

not yet discussed the implications of the Tampa incident for the limits on

the use of the ADF under executive power. Was it internal security or was it

an external security operation? Within the taxonomy of this book it could

possibly be both. Chapter 6 will discuss external security operations other

than war. It will analyse such operations as being external to Australia and

relying upon prerogative power, where there is no intention to prosecute

offences within Australian courts. Conceivably the Tampa operation

could have met this description but it also occurred within Australia’s

territorial sea off Christmas Island,174 a place within Commonwealth

171 Except in an armed conflict.

172 Bronitt and Stephens, above n 5, 267–9.

173 (2001) 110 FCR 491.

174 Ibid 491.

201

4. Internal Security

jurisdiction but constitutionally external to the States and Territories.175

The significance of this is that the implications of the Tampa incident for

the use of the ADF under executive power are essentially unique to the

circumstances of border protection.

In the Tampa Case, French J, referring to an ancient prerogative to expel

aliens, saw the executive power as ‘measured by reference to Australia’s

status as a sovereign nation’.176 This is not the same as a prerogative with

respect to emergencies or internal security, or external affairs. Noting the

discussion in Chapter 1 about whether this decision should have relied on

prerogative power or nationhood power, either way, the power in question

relates to preventing the entry of aliens. Section 7A of the Migration Act

since 2001 has explicitly preserved only a very specific field for executive

power in this regard:

The existence of statutory powers under this Act does not prevent the

exercise of any executive power of the Commonwealth to protect

Australia’s borders, including, where necessary, by ejecting persons who

have crossed those borders.

Insofar then as the Tampa Case177 provides authority for the ADF to use

executive power, it is limited to protecting Australia’s borders. It does not

provide a more expansive authority with respect to internal security more

generally, notwithstanding the implications of the case for so many aspects

of the relationship between the ADF and executive power. Importantly, this

175 NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337 (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Case’).

176 (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542. There was a thematic edition of the Public Law Review, being

(2002) 13(2) Public Law Review 85 titled The Tampa Issue with the following articles: John McMillan,

‘Comments on the Justiciability of the Government’s Tampa Actions’, 89; Simon Evans, ‘The Rule

of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’ 94; Kim Rubenstein, ‘Citizenship, Sovereignty and

Migration: Australia’s Exclusive Approach to Membership of the Community’, 102; Graham Thom,

‘Human Rights, Refugees and the MV Tampa Crisis’, 110; Donald Rothwell, ‘The Law of the Sea and

the MV Tampa Incident: Reconciling Maritime Principles with Coastal State Sovereignty’, 118; and

Helen Pringle and Elaine Thompson, ‘The Tampa Affair and the Role of the Australian Parliament’,

128. See also Hugh Smith, ‘A Certain Maritime Incident and Political-Military relations’ (2002)

46(6) Quadrant 38; Sir Ninian Stephen, ‘The Governor-General as Commander in Chief’ (1983)

14 Melbourne University Law Review 563; Michael White, ‘Tampa Incident: Some Subsequent Legal

Issues’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 249; and Stuart Kaye, ‘Tampering with Border Protection:

The Legal and Policy Implications of the Voyage of the MV Tampa’ in Martin Tsamenyi and Chris

Rahman (eds), Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: The MV Tampa and Beyond (Centre for

Maritime Policy, 2002) 59. Virtually all of these articles were critical, directly or indirectly, of at least

some aspects of the government’s handling of this incident.

177 (2001) 110 FCR 491.

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provision also does not create any ‘executive power of the Commonwealth

to protect Australia’s borders’, it merely ensures the Act does not prevent

the exercise of any such executive power which may exist.

Given the judgments in CPCF and M68 discussed in Chapter 1, it is

difficult now to argue that there is any executive power to protect

Australia’s borders. Only Keane J supported it in CPCF178 but even French

CJ did not take the opportunity to develop his earlier position on the

issue.179 Conversely, Hayne and Bell JJ stated clearly that there was no

executive power ‘to prevent the persons concerned entering Australian

territory without a visa’. 180 After lengthy consideration, Kiefel rejected the

proposition181 and in M68 Gordon J also rejected the idea.182 The more

arguable view therefore is that any power to protect Australia’s borders

from nonviolent threats must be found in statute, not executive power.

VII Conclusion

The Tampa Case183 does not assist much in an analysis of the use of

executive power for internal security by the ADF. Part IIIAAA seems

almost to cover the field with respect to ADF internal security powers

now, but there are conceivable situations where this legislation might not

apply and there may have to be a resort to executive power. An analysis

of Pape184 and Williams185 and Australia’s constitutional structure, some

English common-law authorities, as well as ADF experience, indicates

that there are three main potential sources of this executive power—

‘executing or maintaining a law of the Commonwealth’ or the exercise

of a prerogative or nationhood power. Supporting the exercise of each of

these sources of power is the aspect of executive power which the ADF

members share in common with any citizen. The main limitation for the

ADF in using this power, in addition to the limitations which would

apply to any citizen doing such things as effecting an arrest or defending

themselves, is that its use must be relate to ‘executing or maintaining a law

of the Commonwealth’ or the exercise of a prerogative or nationhood

178 [2015] HCA 1 [476]–[495].

179 Ibid [40]–[42].

180 Ibid [137]–[151].

181 Ibid [258]–[293].

182 [2016] HCA 1 [372].

183 (2001) 110 FCR 491.

184 (2009) 238 CLR 1.

185 (2012) 248 CLR 156. 

203

4. Internal Security

power. Given that such power is the most ordinary, in that any ordinary

citizen may exercise it, it is ironic that it has been essential to the three

nonstatutory ADF security operations around Bowral in 1978, over

CHOGM in 2002 and to protect the visit of the President of the United

States in 2003.

As to prerogative power, Australia’s federal division of responsibilities

means that the prerogative for maintaining public order, a central aspect

of internal security, lies with the States. The ADF could only possibly rely

upon this prerogative in maintaining public order in the Territories, or

when there is a request from the executive government of a State. This

creates a greater significance for nationhood power. There is a strong

view in some cases, the Hope Protective Security Review and among some

scholars that the Commonwealth has an inherent right to protect itself and

its functions. In the absence of an identifiable prerogative for this purpose

it may well be that nationhood power could be the source of executive

authority for the ADF to protect the Commonwealth and its functions,

such as by protecting visiting dignitaries or in restoring a collapsed State

government. Any action relying upon prerogative or nationhood power

alone that went beyond the power available to any ordinary citizen would

have to be justified by state necessity. Any such power is fraught with

uncertainty however.

Internal security by the ADF, in practice, has really relied upon the powers

available to an ordinary citizen or upon Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act.

Nationhood power may have justified Commonwealth action within

States in the three incidents as not being contrary to s 119. There has

been no constitutional challenge by a State though, and there has been

no use of force such as to cause death or injury, or any significant damage

to property. As a result, there has been no real judicial testing of ADF

powers with respect to internal security. Taking French CJ’s warning to

approach executive power ‘conservatively’ then,186 the use of force in ADF

internal security operations should be no more than any citizen could

exercise and must relate to maintaining a law of the Commonwealth

or supporting the exercise of a prerogative or nationhood power. This

is the limit of federalism as proposed in Chapter 1. Prerogative power,

in the case of a request under s 119 or in a Territory, or nationhood power,

to protect a Commonwealth interest, arguably, could only authorise more,

nonlethal, force in the clearest cases of necessity.

186 Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 24.

This text is taken from Crown and Sword: Executive power and the use of

force by the Australian Defence Force, by Cameron Moore, published 2017

by ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.