Full on Nazism and illegal and unconstitutional bs do not comply with these clearly illegal and immoral and criminal actions of these scumbags
#WakeUp
ππ©π
and yet no one is saying the obvious "if trump and all these fake celebrity shills have recovered without a vaccine, why does anyone else need it?" are they saying that they have some sort of super mutant immunity to it even though its already been declassified to a non threatening non high consequence infectious disease in the uk. this is nazism fat out nwo fuckery PS track and trace only works in the first few weeks of a infection see these files i wrote;
Preamble notice:
this data came from a study on contact tracing for Ebola a highly contagious pathogen and not some piss weak CV cold virus that 99.8% of people infected have recovered from. so it kinda puts it into perspective just how utterly ridiculous this criminal act of government is.
all relevant data highlighted on link above
excerpts from QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF EARLY–STAGE CONTACT TRACING ON CONTROLLING EBOLA DIFFUSION;
contact tracing only works during the initial stages of a contagion spread and not when the "Threat" has gone, and is useless any time after that as most people either have had it or recovered so tracking people who have the fake virus is not what this app is being used for, its targeting people who voice their opinions and are anti nwo anti vax and anti government fuckery ππ©π see https://www.aimspress.com/.../MBE/1551-0018_2018_5_1165.pdf file download
https://ediovision.blogspot.com/2020/05/destroying-fake-contact-tracing.html
Definition
The aim of contact tracing is to facilitate the detection of secondary infections from the contacts of an infected person. However, a large proportion of an infectious individual’s contacts could remain uninfected. We define contact tracing cost as the number of detected individuals who had contact with infections but were not infected.
In the guideline it is mentioned that ""when an infectious individual enters a hospital and his/her laboratory results come out positive,
any person who had contact with him/her in the last 21 days should be traced Therefore, in our proposed model, whenever an infectious individual enters the hospitalised (H ) state, all the individuals exposed to the infected one will be identified and followed up for 21 days"". this includes all hospital and health care workers, first respondents, doctors, nurses, policemen and patients and visitors and delivery persons porters and generally anyone else they happened across in the course of their wanderings, which in itself is ridiculous considering they would most likely potentially have to isolate a few hundred to a thousand healthy people just for merely being in the same place and not necessarily interacting with the one potentially "infected" person in the building, showing the sheer in feasibility and utterly retarded logic being used by the government as a vehicle to subvert our legal rights on this matter, So i say fuck em lets hang the cunts, its treason against the people #Fact
Contact tracing is very effective when paired with "immediate hospitalisation"" in bringing down the reproductive ratio below one. The contacts are usually traced up to the maximum incubation period for the disease [Fourteen days is the incubation period for coronavirus (COVID-19] meaning that 14 days after first out break it becomes totally pointless.
The duration of incubation period has counteracting effects on contact tracing. The contacts need to be monitored longer for diseases with longer incubation periods, which is expensive in terms of resources required. ""When the incubation time is long, we do not gain much by allocating all resources on immediate identification and monitoring of contacts"".
""Since contact tracing protocols need to monitor all the contacts of the infected and hospitalised people"", ""it cannot separate the exposed contacts from the healthy ones"" (the holding of a healthy person against their will amounts to false imprisonment which even for government actors and employees is a crime). Therefore, "contact tracing will significantly increase the financial burden on the public health authorities when many people are needed to be traced" as happened in the West African countries in 2014. (Just imagine how much it will cost for the entire planet it will bankrupt all the nations of Earth and will further push us into a complete and total social and economic destruction and second great depression triggering mass deaths from suicides, no jobs, starvation, poverty, crime murder diseases),
""Contact tracing is therefore, economically only efficient during the early stage of the epidemic""
""When it comes to controlling invasion of a disease within a population, the best option is to contain the propagation processes in the early stage and at its source. Contact tracing is one of the important strategies towards this goal; and this applies to many diseases besides Ebola. Behaviour of the early-stage dynamic process is very different from large scale outbreak"" and not 9 + weeks later
"When the number of cases are low, however, the infection process is characterised by extreme randomness and dynamic fluctuations". Furthermore, contact network dynamism is very influential. As a result, mean-field models or models based on quenched/averaged contact networks are not viable candidates.
""a rapid hospitalisation strategy can bring the value of R0 below 1. If we can hospitalise infected individuals within 2 days (Ξ³ −1 ≤ 2), the epidemic can be controlled effectively. (and not by forcing sick or healthy people to self isolate for 14 days or longer)
To assess the effectiveness of contact tracing in the early stage of the epidemic, we assume three different implementation–time scenarios for contact tracing. The first one is when we implement contact tracing from the beginning (TCT = 1), the second scenario is when contact tracing is started on day 9 (TCT = 9), and the third one is when contact tracing is implemented on day 22 (TCT = 22). To evaluate the effectiveness of contact tracing in a more realistic situation, we consider five identification delay times, Ξ± −1 ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20} days for the three above mentioned scenarios of contact tracing implementation
Contact tracing performance.
To evaluate the performance of contact tracing on the Ebola contagious process, we employ the ROC curve approach. To plot the ROC curve, we compute the Sensitivity or T P R and (1−Specif icity) or F P R in each iteration from equations 2 and 3. We compute the average of these two ratios in 10, 000 simulations. Figure 4 shows T P R as a function of F P R for the 5 identification delays, Ξ± −1 ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20} days, in the three contact tracing implementation scenarios. We project the 3–D ROC plot to get a 2–D ROC plot, as shown in figure 5. In all those three scenarios, when Ξ± −1 increases, the probability to identify secondary infected individuals produced by an infectious individual decreases. Missed–detection probability is the number of exposed individuals who are not traced as defined previously. Therefore, missed–detection is equal to (1 − Sensitivity). Figure 5 clearly shows that an increase in identification delay can increase the missed–detection probability. Furthermore, early implementation of contact tracing is needed for improving efficiency and reducing cost. "It is evident from the figure that the second and third scenarios produce a lot more false positives than the true positives". This implies that the costs of contact tracing could overshadow its benefits if contact tracing is started late
Effectiveness of contact tracing.
To measure the effectiveness of contact tracing, we use the term epidemic attack rate (AR), which is the cumulative total of exposed/infected individuals during the disease evolution. In figure 2, we plot the attack ratio, ARΞ±/AR0 as a function of the identification delay, Ξ±−1. Here, AR0 is the mean attack rate when no contact tracing strategy is used and ARΞ± is the mean attack rate for a contact tracing strategy with an identification delay of Ξ±−1. The plots are the averaged results of 10, 000 simulations. Figure 2 shows that contact tracing is more effective in the first and the second scenario when the identification delay, Ξ± −1, is less than 10 days. In the third scenario, we still observe a reduction in the attack ratio, although not as influential as in the first two.
"Making the identification rate faster could bring the attack ratio down significantly if contact tracing is started early (< 10 days), otherwise, it is not so effective in controlling the epidemic"
conclusion.
In this paper, we have simulated contact tracing
on a compartmental model of Ebola in an activity driven network (ADN). We have performed simulations to analyse the effects of contact tracing initiation delay, contact identification delay, and hospitalisation delay. Our results suggest that it is critical to start contact tracing within a few days (< 10 days), if not immediately
after the disease emergence, and 9 weeks plus 4 days is way beyond that limit showing just how useless a plan it is and how highly ineffective contact tracing at this point in time is. and can only be used as a illegal people tracking system and not a virus tracker.
#WakeUp
#ItsAllFake
ππ©π
destroying the fake Contact tracing narrative with logic and facts.
#WakeUp
ππ©π
Preamble notice:
this is data came from a study on contact tracing for Ebola a highly contagious pathogen and not some piss weak CV cold virus that 99.8% of people infected have recovered from. so it kinda puts it into perspective just how utterly ridiculous this criminal act of government is.
excerpts from QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF EARLY–STAGE CONTACT TRACING ON CONTROLLING EBOLA DIFFUSION;
Definition
The aim of contact tracing is to facilitate the detection of secondary infections from the contacts of an infected person. However, a large proportion of an infectious individual’s contacts could remain uninfected. We define contact tracing cost as the number of detected individuals who had contact with infections but were not infected.
In the guideline it is mentioned that ""when an infectious individual enters a hospital and his/her laboratory results come out positive,
any person who had contact with him/her in the last 21 days should be traced Therefore, in our proposed model, whenever an infectious individual enters the hospitalised (H ) state, all the individuals exposed to the infected one will be identified and followed up for 21 days"". this includes all hospital and health care workers, first respondents, doctors, nurses, policemen and patients and visitors and delivery persons porters and generally anyone else they happened across in the course of their wanderings, which in itself is ridiculous considering they would most likely potentially have to isolate a few hundred to a thousand healthy people just for merely being in the same place and not necessarily interacting with the one potentially "infected" person in the building, showing the sheer in feasibility and utterly retarded logic being used by the government as a vehicle to subvert our legal rights on this matter, So i say fuck em lets hang the cunts, its treason against the people #Fact
Contact tracing is very effective when paired with "immediate hospitalisation"" in bringing down the reproductive ratio below one. The contacts are usually traced up to the maximum incubation period for the disease [Fourteen days is the incubation period for coronavirus (COVID-19] meaning that 14 days after first out break it becomes totally pointless.
The duration of incubation period has counteracting effects on contact tracing. The contacts need to be monitored longer for diseases with longer incubation periods, which is expensive in terms of resources required. ""When the incubation time is long, we do not gain much by allocating all resources on immediate identification and monitoring of contacts"".
""Since contact tracing protocols need to monitor all the contacts of the infected and hospitalised people"", ""it cannot separate the exposed contacts from the healthy ones"" (the holding of a healthy person against their will amounts to false imprisonment which even for government actors and employees is a crime). Therefore, "contact tracing will significantly increase the financial burden on the public health authorities when many people are needed to be traced" as happened in the West African countries in 2014. (Just imagine how much it will cost for the entire planet it will bankrupt all the nations of Earth and will further push us into a complete and total social and economic destruction and second great depression triggering mass deaths from suicides, no jobs, starvation, poverty, crime murder diseases),
""Contact tracing is therefore, economically only efficient during the early stage of the epidemic""
""When it comes to controlling invasion of a disease within a population, the best option is to contain the propagation processes in the early stage and at its source. Contact tracing is one of the important strategies towards this goal; and this applies to many diseases besides Ebola. Behaviour of the early-stage dynamic process is very different from large scale outbreak"" and not 9 + weeks later
"When the number of cases are low, however, the infection process is characterised by extreme randomness and dynamic fluctuations". Furthermore, contact network dynamism is very influential. As a result, mean-field models or models based on quenched/averaged contact networks are not viable candidates.
""a rapid hospitalisation strategy can bring the value of R0 below 1. If we can hospitalise infected individuals within 2 days (Ξ³ −1 ≤ 2), the epidemic can be controlled effectively. (and not by forcing sick or healthy people to self isolate for 14 days or longer)
To assess the effectiveness of contact tracing in the early stage of the epidemic, we assume three different implementation–time scenarios for contact tracing. The first one is when we implement contact tracing from the beginning (TCT = 1), the second scenario is when contact tracing is started on day 9 (TCT = 9), and the third one is when contact tracing is implemented on day 22 (TCT = 22). To evaluate the effectiveness of contact tracing in a more realistic situation, we consider five identification delay times, Ξ± −1 ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20} days for the three above mentioned scenarios of contact tracing implementation
Contact tracing performance.
To evaluate the performance of contact tracing on the Ebola contagious process, we employ the ROC curve approach. To plot the ROC curve, we compute the Sensitivity or T P R and (1−Specif icity) or F P R in each iteration from equations 2 and 3. We compute the average of these two ratios in 10, 000 simulations. Figure 4 shows T P R as a function of F P R for the 5 identification delays, Ξ± −1 ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20} days, in the three contact tracing implementation scenarios. We project the 3–D ROC plot to get a 2–D ROC plot, as shown in figure 5. In all those three scenarios, when Ξ± −1 increases, the probability to identify secondary infected individuals produced by an infectious individual decreases. Missed–detection probability is the number of exposed individuals who are not traced as defined previously. Therefore, missed–detection is equal to (1 − Sensitivity). Figure 5 clearly shows that an increase in identification delay can increase the missed–detection probability. Furthermore, early implementation of contact tracing is needed for improving efficiency and reducing cost. "It is evident from the figure that the second and third scenarios produce a lot more false positives than the true positives". This implies that the costs of contact tracing could overshadow its benefits if contact tracing is started late
Effectiveness of contact tracing.
To measure the effectiveness of contact tracing, we use the term epidemic attack rate (AR), which is the cumulative total of exposed/infected individuals during the disease evolution. In figure 2, we plot the attack ratio, ARΞ±/AR0 as a function of the identification delay, Ξ±−1. Here, AR0 is the mean attack rate when no contact tracing strategy is used and ARΞ± is the mean attack rate for a contact tracing strategy with an identification delay of Ξ±−1. The plots are the averaged results of 10, 000 simulations. Figure 2 shows that contact tracing is more effective in the first and the second scenario when the identification delay, Ξ± −1, is less than 10 days. In the third scenario, we still observe a reduction in the attack ratio, although not as influential as in the first two.
"Making the identification rate faster could bring the attack ratio down significantly if contact tracing is started early (< 10 days), otherwise, it is not so effective in controlling the epidemic"
conclusion.
In this paper, we have simulated contact tracing
on a compartmental model of Ebola in an activity driven network (ADN). We have performed simulations to analyse the effects of contact tracing initiation delay, contact identification delay, and hospitalisation delay. Our results suggest that it is critical to start contact tracing within a few days (< 10 days), if not immediately
after the disease emergence, and 9 weeks plus 4 days is way beyond that limit showing just how useless a plan it is and how highly ineffective contact tracing at this point in time is. and can only be used as a illegal people tracking system and not a virus tracker.
#WakeUp
#ItsAllFake
ππ©π
#YoureWelcome
