Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends
(even though they are illegal)
No nation publicly acknowledges either an offensive biological weapons (BW) program or stockpile. Examination of unclassified sources indicates that several nations are considered, with varying degrees of certainty, to have some BW capability. These are: China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Israel,48 North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Taiwan.49 Iraq had a biological weapons program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, but ended the program in the 1990s. Libya had in the past been named as a country with a biological weapons program. But after Tripoli announced in 2003 that it would eliminate its WMD programs, no evidence of a biological weapons program was discovered.50 There is evidence that Al-Qa'ida had a BW program prior to the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.51
Biological Weapons Trends
Because much of the material and equipment used to produce BW has legitimate medical, agricultural, or industrial purposes, and because BW could be produced covertly in a relatively small facility, other countries or groups may have undetected BW programs. Much of the concern over biological weapons has shifted from national programs to the prospect of terrorist acquisition. The concerted, but ultimately unsuccessful, efforts of the Aum Shinrikyo group in Japan to weaponize anthrax in the 1990s demonstrated both the attractiveness of BW to terrorists and the inherent difficulties in weaponization. This leads some experts to maintain that terrorist groups would have difficulty obtaining sufficient materials and know-how to grow, handle, store and disperse biological agents to have a large-scale lethal effect.52 With time, however, as biotechnology becomes more widely accessible, some terrorist groups, particularly those with significant state sponsorship, could be able to mount a more successful BW effort. It should be noted that even a small volume of biological agent or toxin, if properly dispersed, could cause significant casualties in an unprotected densely populated area. From a terrorist perspective, even small-scale attacks could provide a very significant political effect, as was demonstrated by the anthrax-laden letters mailed to the U.S. Senate and several news organisations in 2001.53
The covert development of biological weapons, especially in non-member states, remains hard to detect; the use of BW is hard to defend against; and a BW attack could cause potentially enormous casualties or destruction of crops. International trade in BW material, equipment, and technology remains a concern. In the coming decades, as biotechnology makes further advances and international flows of information, people, and goods continue to grow, the threat of biological warfare may also increase. (See "Chemical Weapons Trends" below for a CIA list of trends in chemical and biological weapons proliferation.)
Chemical Weapon Arsenals and Programs
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which went into effect in 1997, member countries are to have destroyed their stockpiles by April 2007. In July 2007, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) confirmed that Albania had become the first country to have destroyed its declared CWs. Five other states—India, Libya, Russia, South Korea, and the United States—have declared possession of such weapons. All have stated that they will destroy their weapons by the Convention's April 29, 2012, deadline. However, observers have expressed doubts that all will be able to do so, owing to technical and legal challenges. Twelve countries also reported facilities for the production of CW and have pledged to destroy them or convert them to civilian uses. All of the member-states' declared CW production facilities have been destroyed, according to the OPCW.
The effect of the CWC has probably been to reduce the number of parties with chemical weapons and to reduce the likelihood they will be used. Indeed, the OPCW's Verification Director Horst Reeps stated in October 2007 that no violations of the CWC have been detected. Nevertheless, it is not clear which countries still have CW programs because the Convention has not been aggressively implemented and there have been no challenge inspections.54 Several countries that ratified the CWC have probably terminated their CW programs, but it is suspected that some signatories (such as Iran and China) and several countries that have not ratified the Convention (Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and Syria) may still be developing or producing CW.55
Chemical agents can be delivered by aircraft, drones, artillery, rocket launchers, sub-munitions on cruise or ballistic missiles, dispersion from a chemical reaction or manual or mechanical release. Several countries reportedly have CW warheads for their missiles.
Chemical Weapons Trends
Technology and materials for the production of lethal chemical agents are available internationally, and production facilities can be concealed, so it is possible that additional countries and sub-national groups may develop CW capabilities. In 1995, the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo launched attacks in the Tokyo subway with sarin, a chemical nerve agent. The relatively small number of fatalities (13) indicated the difficulty in effectively disseminating CW agents, however the extent of short-term civil disruption was significant. It is expected that terrorist groups will continue their efforts to obtain a CW capability, and could be assisted in this by state sponsors of terrorism.56 The intelligence community has assessed that al-Qaida had a chemical weapons program before the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Whether this assessment was accurate is unclear.57 Producers of small quantities of CW could multiply, but restrictions established under the CWC are expected to limit large-scale production and stockpiles among CWC states parties.58 The extent to which the worldwide CW threat decreases or increases in the coming decade depends in part on how effectively the CWC is implemented.59
The Central Intelligence Agency has identified several dangerous chemical and biological weapons proliferation trends:60
Developments in biotechnology, including genetic engineering, may produce a wide variety of live agents and toxins that are difficult to detect and counter; and new CW agents and mixtures of CW and BW agents are being developed.
Some countries are becoming self-sufficient in producing CW and BW agents and less dependent on imports.
Countries are using the natural overlap between weapons and civilian applications of chemical and biological materials to conceal CW and BW production; controlling exports of dual-use technology is ever more difficult.
Countries with CW and BW capabilities are acquiring sophisticated delivery systems including cruise and ballistic missiles.
Scientists with experience in CW and BW production continue to leave countries of the former Soviet Union.
About one dozen terrorist groups have sought CW, BW, and nuclear material or expressed interest in them; several countries with CW and BW capabilities have sponsored terrorists.
