NARCAP TR 20 - Video of UAP from cockpit taken by a commercial pilot over Mexico
NARCAP
NARCAP Technical Report 20
An Independent Analysis of a March 19, 2020 Aviation Safety-Related Incident involving UAP, Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, Over Mexico
Ted Roe
June 1, 2020
Copyright 2020
May not be reprinted without written permission from NARCAP.org
On April 27, 2020 NARCAP was contacted by MUFON CAG member Mr. Bob Spearing and California State MUFON Director Mr. Ruben Uriarte regarding a report they had received involving an encounter between an American aircrew flying a Boeing 767 registered in the United States and a suspected UAP/Light over Mexico during the night of March 19, 2020. Afterwards, NARCAP received an email from Mr Spearing consisting of 8 photographs of the alleged UAP, a 4:47 video of the encounter taken from the cockpit by the Captain, a still capture from the video of the activated Surveillance Scanning Radar system animation on the TCAS monitor, and a synopsis of the case. After reviewing the case and evidence it was agreed that NARCAP would prepare this second, independent, analysis of the incident.
A NARCAP investigator re-acquired the photographs and videos directly from the crew Captain/witness. NARCAP has deidentified the witnesses, flight number, carrier, etc. to protect the confidentiality of the witnesses.
Definition of Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon
“An Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon, UAP, is the visual stimulus that provokes a sighting report of an object or light seen in the sky, the appearance and/or flight dynamics of which do not suggest a logical, conventional flying object and which remains unidentified after close scrutiny of all available evidence by persons who are technically capable of making both a technical identification as well as a common sense identification, if one is possible.” (NARCAP/Haines, PP 13-22, 1980)
General Overview of the Incident
Crew
The Crew Captain is a career pilot with 19 years of experience flying wide-body aircraft for a major cargo company with an additional 10yrs flying KC-135 refueling tankers for the US Air Force. The First Officer is a career fighter pilot that flew f-15s before working in the private sector. It is reasonable to conclude that both are competent airmen, highly experienced with observing and identifying aircraft, and are capable of determining normal observations and incidents from unusual ones.
Aircraft/Flight/Route/Conditions
The incident occurred late on the evening of March 19, 2020. The Boeing 767 was flying a route from Queretaro International Airport, just north of Mexico City to Memphis, Tennessee.
Fig. 1 Boeing 767
The flight, having left Queretaro Airport at 8:05pm was 50 minutes behind schedule. The aircraft was at cruise altitude, 37,000ft, traveling North-bound at 490kts/ 575mph, 150 miles South of Monterrey, Mexico. The visibility was good, the nearest storms and clouds were 40 miles to the West. This route passes over the sparsely populated state of Tamaulipas and crosses the US border near the towns of Reynosa, Mexico and Brownsville, Texas.
Fig. 2 Air Route
Incident
1. The incident began when the First Officer, looking across to the left side of the cockpit, saw a yellowish white light descend into view from above. He first believed that it was a meteor and began to say so when it suddenly stopped near the same altitude as their aircraft. The UAP/Light then projected an illuminating beam of bright, white, light on their aircraft, and appeared to take a collision heading.
At this moment the Captain also saw the beam of light projected onto their aircraft from the UAP/Light. Both crewmen, in the belief that an aircraft with its landing lights on had turned onto a collision heading with their aircraft, took a defensive attitude and prepared for evasive control inputs.
As they prepared to avoid the apparently approaching UAP/Light, the beam of light illuminating their aircraft ceased, and the UAP/Light suddenly accelerated to the same speed and heading of the aircraft, maintained separation, and paced the aircraft. While estimating distances is difficult the Captain, a former tanker pilot experienced with night-time flight operations, suggested that the UAP/Light maintained a distance of approximately 1-2K ft from the aircraft. Near the minimum allowable separation of 1,000ft.
2. With the immediate threat resolved the Captain and First Officer had the opportunity to look more closely and they realized that they were not looking at another airplane. The Copilot described the UAP/Light: “It was a brilliant yellow white plasma object teardrop shaped!” The Captain exclaimed, “Platillo…., Platillo…” (“saucer”, implying “Flying Saucer” or “Platillo Volador” in Spanish). The pilot mentioned that there were no navigation lights or other features associated with airplanes and that the light seemed to have a tail. At this time both crewmen had decided that they were witnessing something unusual and outside of their direct experience.
3. During the following 30minutes the crew observed and took 8 photographs and four video segments of the UAP including a 4:47 video of the UAP/light embedded in this report.
4. During the video segment the Captain engaged the Combined TCAS and cockpit display, activated the Airborne Collision Avoidance System SSR (Secondary Surveillance radar) system, and turned his video camera phone on the screen. The video documents that the ACAS SSR radar did not detect anything while the crew were actively observing the UAP/Light near their aircraft.
5. As the aircraft and its attendant UAP/Light approached the Mexico/US border the UAP/Light began to flicker, it changed colors from yellow-white to pinkish/purple, and turned on a perpendicular heading away from the aircraft and parallel to the border without crossing into the United States. The rest of the flight to Memphis, Tennessee, USA, was uneventful.
Fig 3 One of eight photographs of the UAP taken by the crew Captain.
Video of the UAP and, at 4:15, the SSR Animation taken by the pilot
Aviation Safety Analysis
Based on the crew testimony and the video there are several aviation safety factors involved and, given the lack of professional guidance, the crew is to be commended for being mindful of safety first and foremost. UAP incidents are unexpected and unpredictable and can call for quick and decisive judgement to avoid disaster (Roe 2019)
1. Collision Headings and Loss of Separation – Loss of separation and collision headings are often reported by pilots during encounters with UAP/Lights. NARCAP has documented many examples. (Roe 2010)
2. Close Pacing - UAP are unpredictable and pilots need to be alert when in close proximity.
3. Crew Distraction - If a crew is not professionally prepared for these incidents and observations and is, instead, taking pictures and video and discussing UAP, their attention is divided during an unpredictable and dangerous situation.
4. Airborne Collision Avoidance System, Failure to detect – Surveillance Scanning Radar, was activated and did not detect the hazard. The failure of the SSR to detect the UAP/Light that the crew was observing is a disturbing and definitive characteristic of several profiles of UAP including UAP/Lights (Roe 2010, 2019).
Fig. 3 ACAS Surveillance Scanning Radar
Animation on the TCAS/ISVI monitor (screen capture from the source video)
5. UAP/Lights are often associated with concurrent temporary and permanent electrical system failures. (Haines-Weinstein 2001 )
6. Not Reported – One of the aircrew did not want to be involved with any report or investigation out of concern for his career. NARCAP has encountered this bias against officially reporting UAP encounters many times (Roe 2002) Neither of the crewman reported their incident to the Aviation Safety Reporting System, ASRS, a confidential reporting system managed independently for the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA. Further, the FAA does not accept pilot reports of incidents and observations involving unidentified aerial phenomena, UAP. The guidance in the Airmen Instruction Manual, AIM, is to make UAP/UFO reports to outside organizations. This is a short-sighted policy that refuses to accept data and work it through until it is resolved and the risk is mitigated.
General Analysis – UAP/Light
Movements
1. The UAP/Light came from above and stopped/hovered near FL37, about the same altitude as the aircraft, shone a light on the 767 and briefly approached the aircraft. Then it instantly matched the speed, and heading of the aircraft and maintained a consistent separation.
a. The light descended vertically, stopped abruptly, and shone a light on the 767 causing the crew to believe that there was another airliner on a collision heading with its landing lights on.
b. It changed direction from vertical descent to a sudden stop/hover, to approaching the aircraft briefly, to taking the same heading and speed of the aircraft at about the same altitude and an estimated distance of 1-2k ft.
c. It matched the altitude, speed, and heading of the aircraft, 575mph and at 37,000ft for over 32 minutes.
d. The UAP/Light changed colors and turned away from the aircraft on a perpendicular heading, West, just inside the Mexico/US border.
e. The UAP/light did not have wings or running lights. It was a new and unique observation to the experienced air crew.
These movements, sudden stop/hover and explosive acceleration, are not consistent with known aerial phenomena but they are characteristic movements of UAP (Roe 2019). Coming to a sudden full stop/ hover and performing explosive accelerations implies that the UAP/Light does not experience resistance to change in velocity (inertia).
UAP do not fly using propulsive force and aerodynamic lift, they do not have thrust ports and wings. UAP do not balance the forces of lift, thrust, drag, and gravity nor do they have to “fly” around a curve to change heading. UAP can explosively accelerate, stop and hover suddenly, and make angular changes of heading in any direction without concern for inertial effects. (Roe 2019)
If UAP/Lights are coherent plasma systems like ball lightning they would not experience noticeable inertial effects. However, the tear-drop shape of this UAP/Light as it travels at 575mph suggests that it has density and is masking an object.
Appearances
1. The UAP/Light remained consistent in appearance, a tear-drop shape, blunt end to the direction of travel and tail streaming behind. It radiated a bright, yellow-white light for over 32 minutes.
2. Color – the UAP consistently maintained a yellow-white color throughout the incident, changing colors to a lower spectrum, pinkish/purple, when it departed from the vicinity of the aircraft.
3. Luminosity - The luminosity of this UAP/Light is plasma. This UAP/Light is probably a dense system or an object generating luminous ionized gases.
1. The luminosity emanated from the entire surface of the UAP/Light, brightly radiating in all directions. It did not arise from any fixed position on the UAP/Light.
2. Tear-Drop Shape - The UAP/Light was moving at 575mph with light streaming behind it giving it a tear drop shape. This suggests that there is density inside the UAP/light that is forcing luminous ionized gases around it as it pushes through the atmosphere.
If the UAP/Light is a dense ball of plasma or an object enveloped in plasma then, at slower velocities, it may appear to be a ball of light. At higher speeds, like this incident, the plasma is shaped by atmospheric resistance and air flow around the dense core of the UAP
creating a tear-drop shape.
3. Duration – Naturally occurring localized plasmas like Ball Lightning have a 5-7 second duration. This incident was over 32 minutes in duration with the luminosity visible, consistent and coherent, throughout the entire incident.
Plasma generation requires a power source to create the alternating or direct electrical current, or magnetic fields, or heat, or electromagnetic energy like radio frequency or microwave that is the cause of the ionization reaction and to maintain a coherent and consistent output of ionized gas over long durations. Some technical designs can create their own power source from the electron flow of the plasma itself. Some technical designs of vehicles that are enveloped in plasma to either reduce radar cross section, or to control airflow over a surface, or to use plasma as propulsion include plasma actuators and electromagnets that generate and array the plasma around the device (Roy, et al 2011).
4. The luminosity was consistent throughout the movements of the UAP/Light including when it descended from above, came to a full stop and hovered, and then accelerated to match the speed and velocity of the aircraft. Plasma generation was not caused by heat from atmospheric friction. The UAP/Light was generating luminosity throughout the incident independently of its movement. The velocity of the UAP, 575mph, is not fast enough to create ionization with heat from atmospheric friction.
5. One explanation for this UAP/Light defeating radar detection is that this UAP/Light is a plasma, or solid object enveloped in plasma, and it absorbed the radar signal. Stealth aircraft deploy plasmas to absorb radar frequencies and further reduce their minimal radar cross-section.
Conclusions
1. This case and description of UAP is consistent with many cases documented by NARCAP and others over the last 90years. An analysis of US aviation safety-related cases involving UAP revealed that of 120 cases reviewed, 44 involved UAP that presented as light forms, balls of light, 360-degree radiators (Roe 2010). This case is consistent in movement and appearance with the cases in that study.
2. The coherent and consistent generation of luminosity throughout the incident regardless of its movements, its “tear drop” shape, the duration of the luminosity throughout the incident, and its radar transparency reveals that this UAP/light is an object or a dense, coherent, system that is generating plasma.
3. If the actions of the UAP/Light - approaching the aircraft from above, stopping/hovering, shining a light on the 767, and then pacing it for over 32 minutes - are considered along with its plasma generation capacity the possibility that this profile of UAP/Light is a technical device or system under intelligent control is inescapable and calls for further careful analysis.
4. This case is consistent with many cases involving aircraft and UAP/Lights dating back to the 1940s. The primary difference being that this case is on video. Now there are cameras in the cockpits and they are validating what pilots have been describing anecdotally for over 80 years and the work of NARCAP over the last 20 years.
5. This incident provides more evidence that UAP are a threat to safe aviation. The lack of preparation for aircrews, the failure to collect and analyze data for safety factors, the unpredictability and extreme mobility of UAP, the inability of airborne anti-collision systems to detect UAP, are contributing factors to an unsafe situation. It is unfortunate that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has zero interest in examining these cases and exercising due diligence to mitigate safety factors. Observations and incidents involving suspected UAP should be very thoroughly examined by the aviation safety research community and science in general.
References
Advisory for Pilots, ATC, and Aviation Professionals: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, UAP, and Aviation Safety - Roe / NARCAP 2019
A Preliminary Analysis of the Flight Dynamics of Four Profiles of UAP Commonly Associated with Aviation Safety Incidents as Reported by Pilots - Roe / NARCAP 2019
A Preliminary Study of Fifty-Seven Pilot Sighting Reports Involving Alleged Electro-Magnetic Effects on Aircraft Systems - Haines,Weinstein / NARCAP 2001
Aviation Safety in America: Spherical UAP - Roe / NARCAP 2010
Aviation Safety in America: UAP and Under Reporting Bias – Roe/ NARCAP 2002
Demonstration of a Wingless Electromagnetic Air Vehicle - Applied Physics Research Group, University of Florida, Gainesville PI: Subrata Roy, Co-PIs: David Arnold, Jenshan Lin, Tony Schmidt and Rick Lind 2011
